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ARTIFICIAL INTELLI*ENCE & ARTIFICIAL
PRICE6 6AFE*UAR'IN* 6ECURITIE6
MARKET6 FROMMANIPULATION BY NON
+UMAN ACTOR6
AB6TRACT
Securities traders are currently competing to use Artificial Intelligence
(A.I.) in order to make more profitable decisions in the marketplace. While
A.I. provides superior abilities in recognizing market patterns, its
complexity can obscure its decision-making process beyond human
comprehension. Problematically, the current securities laws prohibiting
manipulation of securities prices rest liability for violations on a trader’s
intent. In order to prepare for A.I. market participants, both courts and
regulators need to accept that human concepts of decision-making will be
inadequate in regulating A.I. behavior. However, the wealth of case law in
the market manipulation doctrine need not be cast aside. Industry
regulators should instead require A.I. users to harness the power of their
machines to provide meaningful feedback in order to both detect potential
manipulations and create evidentiary records in the event that allegations
of A.I. manipulation arise.
INTRO'UCTION
,n an era wKere maVViYe amountV of information are eaVily acceVViEle
Yia tKe internet anG aGYanceV in computer KarGware are continuouVly
improYinJ our aEility to proceVV more Gata, it iV common to Kear termV like
³artificial intelliJence´ $, anG ³macKine learninJ´ in GiVcuVVionV of tKe
lateVt cuttinJeGJe tecKnoloJy :Kile tKeVe conceptV are applieG in a ranJe
of VettinJV, tKey Jenerally refer to tKe uVe of computerV to tKink anG act
inGepenGently of KumanV, particularly wKen preGictionV neeG to Ee maGe
EaVeG on larJe VetV of Gata
1
7KeVe metKoGV are EecominJ increaVinJly
releYant to financial inVtitutionV, eVpecially tKoVe traGinJ in VecuritieV
marketV
2
6ecuritieV reJulationV, KoweYer, Go not contemplate liaEility for
$, actorV anG Vome YiolationV reTuire a finGinJ of Kuman intent

Often,
tKe intent of an $, VyVtem¶V GeYeloper will not Ee reflecteG in tKe $,¶V
1. See generally Calum McClellanG, The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, Machine
Learning, and Deep Learning, ME',UM 'ec 4, 201, KttpVmeGiumcomiotforalltKe
GifferenceEetweenartificialintelliJencemacKinelearninJanGGeeplearninJaaEff991
GeVcriEinJ an e[ample wKere ³feeGinJ KuJe amountV of Gata´ to an alJoritKm can allow it to
aGMuVt itVelf anG increaVe accuracy in GetermininJ wKetKer an imaJe containV a cat
2. See $nJelo CalYello, With BlackRock’s Artificial Intelligence Pivot, the Rubicon Has Been
Crossed, ,N67,7U7,ON$L ,NV May 1, 201, KttpVwwwinVtitutionalinYeVtorcomarticle
E10pTT0E11witKElackrockVartificialintelliJencepiYottKeruEiconKaVEeencroVVeG
 7Ke 6ecuritieV anG E[cKanJe $ct of 194, wKicK proKiEitV conGuct like manipulation of
VecuritieV priceV, reTuireV intent aV an element for liaEility See $76, Commc¶nV, ,nc Y 6Kaar
FunG, LtG., 49 FG , 101 2G Cir 200
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oEVerYaEle cKaracteriVticV Gue to itV comple[ity
4
7Kerefore, if $, actorV
e[KiEit Karmful EeKaYior in VecuritieV marketV Eut Go not reYeal tKeir intent,
tKen tKere may Ee no one to KolG accountaEle unGer tKe current VecuritieV
reJulationV
7KiV Note VuJJeVtV tKat reJulatory anG MuGicial action are neceVVary to
preYent $, GeYeloperV from eVcapinJ liaEility for Karmful market EeKaYior
6pecifically, tKiV Note aGGreVVeV tKe actionV tKat can Ee taken to preYent
$, from manipulatinJ VecuritieV priceV anG to Vupport enforcement aJainVt
GeYeloperV

of manipulatiYe $, 3art , of tKiV Note e[plainV tKe EenefitV
anG limitationV of $, anG tKe implicationV of uVinJ $, to traGe VecuritieV
3art ,, GiVcuVVeV tKe leJal Goctrine of market manipulation anG tKe
proElematic aEVence of reJulationV for $, traGerV 3art ,,, e[plainV Kow a
clarifieG Gefinition of market manipulation coupleG witK inGuVtry teVtinJ
VtanGarGV for $, coulG Kelp preYent anG Getect $, manipulation 3art ,V
GeVcriEeV Kow courtV miJKt tKen reYiVit tKe e[iVtinJ Goctrine of market
manipulation to make uVe of new inGuVtry VtanGarGV in liJKt of tKe
increaVinJ inYolYement of $, in VecuritieV marketV
I AI AN' IT6 POTENTIAL    PROBLEM6
A T+E TEC+NOLO*Y, T+E IN'U6TRY9ALUE, AN' T+E LE*AL
*AP
7o EeJin, $, iV GefineG Vimply aV tKe aEility of a macKine, VucK aV a
computer, to perform taVkV commonly aVVociateG witK intelliJent EeinJV

³MacKine learninJ´ iV a metKoG of acKieYinJ $, witKout e[plicitly
inVtructinJ a macKine Kow to perform itV taVk

For e[ample, one VuEVet of
macKine learninJ calleG ³Geep learninJ´ makeV uVe of artificial neural
networkV $NNV, wKicK are computer arcKitectureV rouJKly moGeleG after
tKe Kuman Erain

7Ke noYel Vtructure of $NNV allowV macKineV to reacK
unpreceGenteG leYelV of comple[ity in analy]inJ aEVtract patternV, wKicK
4. See YaYar BatKaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 1 +$RV JL & 7EC+ 9, 901 201 GiVcuVVinJ Kow EotK comple[ity in an $,
macKine¶V Vtructure anG itV aEility to proceVV a larJe numEer of YariaEleV to reacK a GeciVion make
it Gifficult, if not impoVViEle, to unGerVtanG e[actly Kow a Elack Eo[ macKine iV arriYinJ at a
GeciVion
 :Kile ³GeYeloperV´ in a colloTuial VenVe miJKt refer only to tKoVe wKo are Girectly
inYolYeG in traininJ tKe $,, tKiV Note uVeV ³GeYeloperV´ more EroaGly, to incluGe any partieV or
entitieV tKat funG tKe GeYelopment of anG profit from tKe operation of tKe $,
 6tefan Yan 'uin & NaVer BakKVKi, Part 1: Artificial Intelligence Defined, 'ELO,77E Mar
2, 201, KttpVwww2GeloittecomnlnlpaJeVGataanalyticVarticleVpart1artificial
intelliJenceGefineGKtml
 RatKer, tKe macKine iV JiYen traininJ Gata to proceVV aV tKe macKine ³trainV,´ it recoJni]eV
patternV in tKe Gata From tKeVe patternV, tKe macKine internally aGMuVtV itV own alJoritKm in orGer
to make more accurate cateJori]ationV or preGictionV aEout future Gata McClellanG, supra note 1
 CKarlie CrawforG, An Introduction to Deep Learning, $L*OR,7+M,$ NoY 4, 201,
KttpVEloJalJoritKmiacomintroGuctiontoGeeplearninJ
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KumanV KaYe cKanneleG into impreVViYe anG Eeneficial applicationV
9
For
inVtance, Geep learninJ iV notaEle for itV implementation in VyVtemV tKat
JuiGe autonomouV YeKicleV, tranVlate lanJuaJe in real time, anG tKat are
Vuperior to KumanV in otKer aEVtract taVkV²like playinJ tKe ancient CKineVe
Jame *o
10
7KeVe GefinitionV anG e[ampleV are VomewKat curVory
conViGerinJ tKe rate at wKicK $, tecKnoloJy iV eYolYinJ anG EeinJ applieG
to a JrowinJ numEer of taVkV 7Ke important takeaway iV tKat acroVV all itV
applicationV, $,
11
iV EeinJ uVeG to more efficiently make preGictionV from
larJe GataVetV
NowKere iV tKe aEility to make accurate preGictionV more YaluaEle tKan
in tKe worlG of finance Financial inVtitutionV can uVe $, to anticipate
future riVkV EaVeG on larJe VetV of KiVtorical Gata, wKetKer tKe taVk iV
GetermininJ tKe creGitwortKineVV of potential EorrowerV or GetectinJ
frauGulent tranVactionV Ey cuVtomerV
12
7KiV preGictiYe power iV eVpecially
YaluaEle in VecuritieV marketV, wKere anticipatinJ anG reVponGinJ to ViJnalV
of market moYement iV alreaGy critical in JaininJ an aGYantaJe oYer
competitorV
1
Naturally, $, KaV attracteG tKe intereVt of VecuritieV traGerV,
anG tKe worlG¶V leaGinJ aVVet manaJerV are alreaGy e[perimentinJ witK $,
to make inYeVtment cKoiceV
14
:Kile $,¶V power miJKt JiYe traGerV a cauVe for celeEration, tKe
practical limitationV of $, create a reJulatory cauVe for concern 7KiV iV
EecauVe $,¶V aEility to ³learn´ witKout e[plicit inVtruction correVponGinJly
makeV it Gifficult for KumanV to concluGe Kow it makeV GeciVionV
1
7KiV iV
referreG to aV tKe ³Elack Eo[´ proElem, anG practitionerV anG acaGemicV
KaYe oEVerYeG tKat it KaV tKe potential to create iVVueV in YariouV leJal
9 $NNV proceVV input Gata tKrouJK ³noGeV,´ aV neuronV Go in tKe Erain, anG JroupV of noGe
outputV are VyntKeVi]eG in ³layerV´ 7Ke ³GeptK´ in Geep learninJ tKen occurV wKen multiple layerV
are interconnecteG, aV aGGitional layerV allow for tKe aJJreJation of Gata from tKe preYiouV layer
to Ee reanaly]eG witK reVpect to otKer YariaEleV, acKieYinJ a KiJKer leYel of aEVtraction in
recoJni]inJ patternV See Larry +arGeVty, Explained: Neural Networks, M,7 NE:6 $pr 14,
201, KttpnewVmiteGu201e[plaineGneuralnetworkVGeeplearninJ0414
10 CrawforG, supra note 
11 :Kile tKe term ³$,´ coYerV a EroaG ranJe of macKineV from Vimple to comple[, it KaV
Eeen uVeG colloTuially to GeVcriEe comple[, Vtate of tKe art implementationV of macKine learninJ
For conViVtency, tKiV iV wKat will Ee referreG to aV $, for tKe purpoVeV of tKiV Note, eYen tKouJK
only a Vmall VuEVet of artificially intelliJent macKineV iV likely releYant to tKe GiVcuVVion Kerein
12. See Larry ' :all, Some Financial Regulatory Implications of Artificial Intelligence, 100
J ECON & BU6 ,  201
1 :itK computerV traGinJ at YaVtly Jreater VpeeGV tKan KumanV, eYen 10 milliVeconG GelayV
in reVponGinJ to newV witK a market impact can leaG to ViJnificant GecreaVeV in returnV for traGerV
See YeVKa YaGaY, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 V$ L REV 101, 10
201
14. See, e.g., :all, supra note 12 GiVcuVVinJ recent GeYelopmentV Ey Blackrock anG J3
MorJan to employ macKine learninJ in cKooVinJ VecuritieV traGeV CalYello, supra note 2
1. See BatKaee, supra note 4 GiVcuVVinJ Kow EotK comple[ity in a macKine¶V Vtructure anG
itV aEility to proceVV a larJe numEer of YariaEleV to reacK a GeciVion make it Gifficult, if not
impoVViEle, to unGerVtanG e[actly Kow a Elack Eo[ macKine iV arriYinJ at a GeciVion
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conte[tV
1
7Ke Elack Eo[ proElem iV particularly intimiGatinJ in inVtanceV
wKere $, conGuct iV only JoYerneG Ey VtatuteV tKat EaVe liaEility in
Kumancentric conceptV like intent
1
7KiV iV currently tKe caVe for feGeral VecuritieV lawV²Vpecifically, tKe
lawV proKiEitinJ market manipulation of VecuritieV priceV Market
manipulation inYolYeV conGuct ³GeViJneG to GeceiYe or GefrauG inYeVtorV Ey
controllinJ or artificially affectinJ tKe price of VecuritieV´
1
7Ke 6ecuritieV
anG E[cKanJe $ct of 194 tKe $ct, wKicK proKiEitV manipulation, reTuireV
Vcienter, or manipulatiYe intent aV an element for liaEility
19
*iYen tKe
potential for $, uVe in VecuritieV traGinJ anG tKe attenGant Elack Eo[
proElem for $, GeciVionmakinJ,
20
tKere iV tKe loominJ TueVtion aV to Kow
$, traGer intent woulG Ee eYiGenceG in a manipulation action Bear in
minG tKat tKe Elack Eo[ proElem only pertainV to autonomous traGinJ
VyVtemV, wKicK are tKe focuV of tKiV Note 7KeVe are GiVtinct from
automated VyVtemV,
21
wKicK are alreaGy commonplace in VecuritieV
marketV
22
B A +YPOT+ETICAL TO'EMON6TRATE T+ERI6K6 OFAI IN
6ECURITIE6MARKET6
7Kere iV no e[KauVtiYe liVt of manipulatiYe conGuct RatKer, tKe $ct iV
³meant to proKiEit tKe full ranJe of inJeniouV GeYiceV tKat miJKt Ee uVeG to
manipulate VecuritieV priceV´
2
But it iV Kelpful to EeJin Ey conViGerinJ
Kow an $, macKine miJKt commit a claVVic e[ample of market
1. See, e.g., id. at 90±2 GiVcuVVinJ tKe GifficultieV tKat may ariVe in conVtitutional,
VecuritieV, anG antitruVt law Gue to tKe Elack Eo[ proElem .eYin 3etraVic et al, Three Big
Questions About AI in Financial Services, :+,7E & C$6E July 1, 201,
KttpVwwwwKitecaVecompuElicationVinViJKtaifinancialVerYiceV GiVcuVVinJ tKe proElemV
tKat artificial intelliJence poVeV in tKe colluVion, antitruVt, anG conVumer GiVcrimination conte[tV
1. See, e.g., BatKaee, supra note 4, at 92
1 :ilVon Y Merrill LyncK & Co, ,nc, 1 FG 120, 10 2G Cir 2011 TuotinJ ErnVt &
ErnVt Y +ocKfelGer, 42 U6 1, 199 19
19 $76, Commc¶nV, ,nc Y 6Kaar FunG, LtG., 49 FG , 101 2G Cir 200
20. See 3etraVic et al, supra note 1
21 :Kile automateG anG autonomouV VyVtemV miJKt Veem larJely tKe Vame in tKat tKey
inYolYe computerV performinJ functionV witKout mucK Kuman interYention, automateG VyVtemV Go
not neceVVarily create a Elack Eo[ proElem EYen tKouJK tKey e[ecute tranVactionV inGepenGently,
wKen tKeir taVkV are preGefineG, a GeYeloper¶V intent may Ee imputeG from tKe VyVtemV¶
proJramminJ See 6tanton JoneV, Automation, Autonomy and the Messy In-Between, ,NFO 6ERV6
*ROU3, KttpVwwwiVJonecomreVearcKarticleVautomationautonomyanGtKemeVVyin
Eetween laVt YiViteG 6ept 2, 2019 7KiV GoeV not mean automateG VyVtemV KaYe not createG
leJal iVVueV tKey Go not, KoweYer, create tKe eYiGentiary proElemV attenGant to autonomouV
VyVtemV See, e.g., In re FaceEook, ,nc, ,3O 6ec & 'eriYatiYe LitiJ, 9 F 6upp 2G 42, 441
6'NY 201 GeVcriEinJ tKe automateG VyVtem tKat faileG anG createG liaEility for a Vtock
e[cKanJe wKen tKe e[cKanJe iJnoreG teVtinJ tKat VuJJeVteG tKe automateG VyVtem waV not
prepareG for tKe anticipateG orGer traffic
22. See YaGaY, supra note 1, at 10 n1 ³ReportV VuJJeVt tKat alJoritKmic traGinJ iV
reVponViEle for arounG 0 of all traGinJ in eTuitieV in tKe UniteG 6tateV Ey Yolume´
2 6anta Fe ,nGuV, ,nc Y *reen, 40 U6 42, 4 19
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manipulation FirVt, imaJine tKat an $, macKine KaV EroaG acceVV to
information aEout VecuritieV marketV anG KaV tKe aEility to tranVact in tKoVe
marketV
24
7Ke macKine¶V GeYeloperV uVe itV wiGe capacity for Gata to feeG it
YariouV cateJorieV of information aVVociateG witK KiVtorical market
EeKaYior, tKuV traininJ it to recoJni]e market patternV
2
$t Vome point, tKe
macKine iV alloweG to actiYely traGe on itV preGictionV, JuiGeG Ey
parameterV tKat reflect tKe GeYelopinJ traGer¶V own limitationV
2
,f we aVVume tKat tKe GeYeloper trainV tKe macKine to make profitaEle
traGeV, tKen aV tKe macKine learnV it will aVViJn more ³weiJKt´
2
to factorV
tKat correlate witK profitaEility OYer time, tKe macKine miJKt recoJni]e
tKat certain YariaEleV like traGinJ Yolume can correlate witK a cKanJe in
Vecurity price
2
7Ke macKine miJKt alVo recoJni]e tKat itV own tranVactionV
increaVe traGinJ Yolume 7Kerefore, tKe macKine miJKt eYentually calculate
tKat Ey VimultaneouVly EuyinJ anG VellinJ tKe Vame Tuantity of a Vecurity, it
can itVelf create traGinJ actiYity tKat GriYeV up tKe Vecurity¶V price
29
6ince
tKe tranVactionV will offVet, tKere will Ee a minimi]eG riVk of loVV to tKe $,,
anG it miJKt tKen make otKer profitaEle tranVactionV EaVeG on tKe
anticipateG riVe in Vtock price
0
EffectiYely, tKe VyVtem KaV MuVt learneG Kow to e[ecute a ³waVK Vale,´
wKicK iV an e[ample of claVVically manipulatiYe conGuct unGer 6ection
24. See, e.g., 6imon .uttruf, A Machine Learning Framework for Algorithmic Trading on
Energy Markets, ME',UM Jul 1, 201, KttpVtowarGVGataVciencecomKttpVmeGiumcom
VkuttrufmacKinelearninJinfinancealJoritKmictraGinJonenerJymarketVcEf414
e[plaininJ Kow macKine learninJ coulG Ee uVeG to GeYelop a realtime alJoritKmic traGinJ VyVtem
for European carEon emiVVion certificateV
2 'urinJ traininJ, tKe macKine ³JueVVeV´ wKat will Kappen, anG wKen itV preGictionV are feG
Eack to it, tKe macKine refineV itV alJoritKm Ey JiYinJ more weiJKt to YariaEleV tKat are more
preGictiYe 7KiV e[ample VuJJeVtV a ³VuperYiVeG´ learninJ approacK 6ome macKineV can learn
witKout VuperYiVion, Eut for tKe Vake of a VimplifieG e[ample, tKey are not GifferentiateG Kere See
JuVtin *aJe, Introduction to Machine Learning, $L*OR,7+M,$ Mar 19, 201,
KttpVEloJalJoritKmiacomintroGuctiontomacKinelearninJ
2 EYen tKouJK a macKine woulG make itV preGictionV uVinJ KiVtorical market Gata, a
GeYeloper will Vtill KaYe to manually Vet parameterV relateG to a traGer¶V own perVonal limitationV,
like ³a tKreVKolG for tKe moGel confiGence of a JiYen preGiction, wKat poVition Go you place on tKe
market, wKat poVition Vi]e, for Kow lonJ Go you KolG a poVition in tKe JiYen Vtate of tKe market
etc´ See .uttruf, supra note 24
2. See, e.g., JoKn Mc*onaJle et al, Backpropagation, BR,LL,$N7, KttpVErilliantorJ
wikiEackpropaJation laVt YiViteG 'ec 29, 201 e[plaininJ Kow $NNV aGMuVt tKeir weiJKtV Yia
a metKoG calleG ³EackpropaJation´
2. See :alter 6un, Relationship Between Trading Volume and Security Prices and Returns
FeE , 200, KttpVVJmiteGuawaltVunGocV$reaE[am7R2pGf unpuEliVKeG 3K' $rea
E[am Report, MaVVacKuVettV ,nVtitute of 7ecKnoloJy LaEoratory for ,nformation anG 'eciVion
6yVtemV
29. See Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 4 Y$LE LJ 24,
2±2 19 GiVcuVVinJ tKat wKen ³tKe operator iV EotK Euyer anG Veller of tKe Vame Vtock   
tKe price Vlowly riVeV, >anG@ a comple[ puElicity apparatuV iV Vet into motion to aiG tKe Vtimulation
of GemanG´
0 For e[ample, wKen a party KolGV an option to purcKaVe a Vecurity at Vome price lower tKan
tKe market Yalue, a KiJKer market Yalue will allow tKe party to profit wKen tKey e[erciVe tKe
option anG immeGiately Vell at tKe KeiJKteneG market price See id. at 2
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10E of tKe $ct
1
7KiV iV manipulatiYe EecauVe tKere iV no actual cKanJe in
ownerVKip, Eut tKe tranVactionV JiYe otKer inYeVtorV a falVe impreVVion tKat
tKe Vecurity iV EeinJ leJitimately traGeG
2
RealiVtically, VucK claVVically
manipulatiYe EeKaYior woulG Ee an inGicator of improper traininJ, anG an
improperly traineG $, VyVtem iV unlikely to Ee GeployeG Ey an enterpriVe
wKoVe miVVion iV profitaEility

+oweYer, tKiV e[ample GemonVtrateV a
couple of reaVonV wKy it may Ee more Gifficult to Getect manipulation wKen
$, iV inYolYeG
FirVt, tKe waVK Vale e[ample VKowV tKat market manipulation can
inYolYe capitali]inJ on Vimple relationVKipV Eetween interrelateG market
YariaEleV $, GeciVionmakinJ alreaGy createV a ³GimenVionality
proElem,´
4
in tKat KumanV may Ee unaEle to conceptuali]e tKe patternV a
macKine iV actinJ on ConViGerinJ $, macKineV¶ Vuperior aEility to
recoJni]e patternV, it iV not only conceiYaEle tKat tKey coulG learn claVVic
formV of manipulation, Eut tKat tKey miJKt alVo manipulate in wayV tKat
woulG not Ee reaGily apparent to KumanV

7KiV miJKt Ee eVpecially
proElematic if multiple $, actorV are on eacK ViGe of a tranVaction or are
workinJ toJetKer

6econG, tKe KypotKetical GemonVtrateV tKat
manipulatiYe actiYity can Ee tKe reVult of multiple inGiYiGual tranVactionV,
wKicK miJKt appear leJitimate VtanGinJ alone

$Jain, wKile a
conVpicuouVly manipulatiYe $, VyVtem iV unlikely to Ee GeployeG Ey a
VopKiVticateG GeYeloper, EaG actorV miJKt aYoiG Getection Ey traininJ $, to
conceal any potential manipulationV EeneatK ElanketV of leJitimate traGeV ,t
1. See 6anta Fe ,nGuV, ,nc Y *reen, 40 U6 42, 4 19 GiVcuVVinJ tKat manipulation
iV eVVentially a ³term of art´ in reference to practiceV like waVK ValeV
2. See ErnVt & ErnVt Y +ocKfelGer, 42 U6 1, 20 n2 19 GefininJ waVK ValeV aV
³tranVactionV inYolYinJ no cKanJe in Eeneficial ownerVKip´
 F,N$NC,$L 67$B,L,7Y BO$R', $R7,F,C,$L ,N7ELL,*ENCE $N' M$C+,NE LE$RN,N* ,N
F,N$NC,$L 6ERV,CE6 1±19 201, KttpwwwfVEorJwpcontentuploaGV301111pGf
GiVcuVVinJ tKe common Ventiment tKat many ³Tuant´ funGV are not comfortaEle uVinJ tKeir
traGinJ moGelV if tKey cannot unGerVtanG Kow a particular preGiction iV maGe
4. See BatKaee, supra note 4, at 92
 7KiV coulG potentially compounG an e[iVtinJ proElem, aV tKere iV alreaGy uncertainty aV to
Kow mucK market manipulation occurV aV a reVult of Kuman actorV, wKo are preVumaEly eaVier to
monitor See Merritt B Fo[, Lawrence R *loVten & *aEriel V RauterEerJ, Stock Market
Manipulation and Its Regulation,  Y$LE J ON RE* , ±0 201 GiVcuVVinJ VtuGieV
VKowinJ tKe e[iVtence of certain typeV of manipulatiYe EeKaYior Eut commentinJ tKat oYerall tKere
iV little Gata VKowinJ Kow often market manipulation occurV on tKe wKole
 $riel E]racKi & Maurice E 6tucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers
Inhibit Competition, 201 U ,LL L REV 1, 1 201 GiVcuVVinJ tKe potential for
inGepenGent macKineV to Eecome interGepenGent on eacK otKer in tKe conte[t of antitruVt in
marketV wKere competitorV are eacK uVinJ macKineV to Vet priceV 7Ke Vame potential in tKe
VecuritieV market coulG leaG to manipulatiYe VcKemeV wKere GiVcrete macKineV eacK take a
Gifferent role in a larJer manipulation, wKicK coulG leaG to a VcKeme tKat iV more complicateG to
Getect
. See $76, Commc¶nV, ,nc Y 6Kaar FunG, LtG, 49 FG , 102 2G Cir 200 notinJ
tKat ³in Vome caVeV Vcienter iV tKe only factor tKat GiVtinJuiVKeV leJitimate traGinJ from improper
manipulation´
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will tKen Ee important to rememEer tKat wKile macKineV miJKt Ee Elack
Eo[eV for any JiYen GeciVion, tKey are Vtill ultimately only tKe proGuct of
tKeir GeYeloper¶V traininJ

,n eitKer caVe, tKe TueVtion of wKat tKe $, ³intenGeG´ to Go miJKt Ee
impoVViEly conYoluteG MoreoYer, EotK VituationV inYolYe a riVk of Karm to
VecuritieV marketV, reJarGleVV of tKe GeYeloper¶V intent
9
$ltKouJK tKere
KaYe not Eeen any formal alleJationV of $, market manipulation aV of late,
it iV only a matter of time Eefore courtV will Ee taVkeG witK aGMuGicatinJ tKe
leJality of $, EeKaYior JiYen itV potential utility in traGinJ VecuritieV
40
FurtKermore, unlike faroff concernV reJarGinJ Kumanlike anG Jenerally
VkilleG autonomouV $,,
41
tKe waVK traGe e[ample GemonVtrateV tKat tKe
aEility to traGe VecuritieV, wKicK coulG eaVily Ee aVViJneG to $, JiYen
current tecKnoloJy, iV all tKat iV neeGeG to manipulate VecuritieV priceV
42
II CURRENT A9ENUE6 FOR MANIPULATION LIABILITY
A PRIMARY9IOLATION6 FORMANIPULATIONUN'ER 6ECTION
B OF T+EACT
FirVt, it iV important to unGerVtanG wKy manipulatiYe tranVactionV, like
waVK ValeV, are proKiEiteG 6ection 10E of tKe $ct makeV it illeJal ³>t@o
 7Ke ³+omunculuV Fallacy´ reminGV uV tKat ³µtKere iV no little perVon inViGe tKe proJram¶
,nVteaG alJoritKmV act aV tKey are proJrammeG to act²no more, no leVV´ See .arni CKaJal
Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 201 U ,LL JL 7EC+ & 3OL¶Y 111, 12 201 footnote
omitteG
9. See Fo[ et al, supra note , at 11 VtatinJ tKat waVK ValeV ³are Vocially Karmful,
KoweYer, in termV of tKe tranVaction reportinJ tKat tKey Jenerate OtKer traGerV Go not know tKat
tKe reporteG tranVactionV inYolYe waVK or matcKeG ValeV 7Key aVVume tKe reporteG priceV reflect
tKe YaluationV of perVonV wKo are enJaJeG in Jenuine purcKaVeV anG ValeV of tKe Vtock anG tKey
react accorGinJly to tKeir GiVaGYantaJe´
40 BotK acaGemicV anG tKoVe in inGuVtry KaYe VKown an intereVt in uVinJ macKine learninJ to
traGe VecuritieV See, e.g., YaGaY, supra note 1, at 10 n12 citinJ two inVtanceV wKere
macKine learninJ KaV Eeen VucceVVfully applieG to preGict market cKanJeV in acaGemia :all,
supra note 12 FurtKermore, inGuVtry leaGerV in VecuritieV traGinJ KaYe implementeG effectiYe $,,
anG commentatorV VuJJeVt tKat competitorV will KaYe no cKoice Eut to implement tKeir own $,
metKoGV or fall out of competition See CalYello, supra note 2
41 :Kile an $, traGer coulG potentially KaYe more Kumanlike aEilitieV eJ,
communication, tKiV Note only conViGerV it practical to aVVeVV $, traGerV witK aEilitieV to traGe
VecuritieV JiYen tKe current Vtate of tKe art 7KiV iV EecauVe practical VucceVV witK Geep learninJ
macKineV KaV Eeen EeVt acKieYeG in narrow implementationV eJ, imaJe recoJnition, anG tKere iV
VkepticiVm aEout tKe potential for Geep learninJ macKineV to reacK a ³Kumanlike´ leYel of
³Jeneral´ intelliJence See *ary MarcuV, In Defense of Skepticism About Deep Learning,
ME',UM, Jan 14, 201, KttpVmeGiumcom#*aryMarcuVinGefenVeofVkepticiVmaEout
GeeplearninJeEfGae0f1 see also JaVon 3ontin, Greedy, Brittle, Opaque, and Shallow: The
Downsides to Deep Learning, :,RE' FeE 2, 201, KttpVwwwwireGcomVtoryJreeGyErittle
opaTueanGVKallowtKeGownViGeVtoGeeplearninJ GiVcuVVinJ tKe aEility of neural networkV in
performinJ narrow taVkV Eut tKeir ultimate GifficultieV witK acKieYinJ more Jeneral intelliJence
42. See 6EC Y MaVri, 2 F 6upp 2G 1, 2 6'NY 200 ³>,@f an inYeVtor conGuctV
an openmarket tranVaction witK tKe intent of artificially affectinJ tKe price of tKe Vecurity, anG not
for any leJitimate economic reaVon, it can conVtitute market manipulation´
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uVe or employ, in connection witK tKe purcKaVe or Vale of any Vecurity   
any manipulatiYe or GeceptiYe GeYice´ in Yiolation of ruleV promulJateG Ey
tKe 6ecuritieV anG E[cKanJe CommiVVion 6EC
4
,n turn, 6EC Rule 10E
a anG c tKen make it unlawful ³>t@o employ any GeYice, VcKeme, or
artifice to GefrauG´ or ³to enJaJe in any act, practice, or courVe of EuVineVV
wKicK operateV or woulG operate aV a frauG or Geceit upon any perVon´ in
connection witK tKe purcKaVe or Vale of VecuritieV
44
7KuV, actV like waVK
ValeV, wKicK affect VecuritieV¶ priceV witKout any leJitimate inYeVtment
purpoVe, KaYe Eecome a welleVtaEliVKeG e[ample of a manipulation
4
FurtKermore, tKe 6upreme Court KaV recoJni]eG tKat tKe $ct¶V proKiEitionV
are not limiteG to Vome preGefineG liVt of tranVactionV ratKer tKey are
³meant to proKiEit full ranJe of inJeniouV GeYiceV tKat miJKt Ee uVeG to
manipulate VecuritieV priceV´ anG refer ³Jenerally to practiceV    tKat are
intenGeG to miVleaG inYeVtorV Ey artificially affectinJ market actiYity´
4
Note tKat not only manipulatiYe actV Eut alVo material miVVtatementV or
omiVVionV inYolYinJ VecuritieV can JiYe riVe to 6ection 10E actionV
4
Rule 10E± reTuireV plaintiffV ErininJ manipulation claimV ³to alleJe
1 manipulatiYe actV 2 GamaJe  cauVeG Ey reliance on an aVVumption
of an efficient market free of manipulation 4 Vcienter  in connection
witK tKe purcKaVe or Vale of VecuritieV  furtKereG Ey tKe GefenGant¶V uVe
of tKe mailV or any facility of a national VecuritieV e[cKanJe´
4
:Kile
Vcienter iV reTuireG for liaEility, any conGuct tKat miVleaGV inYeVtorV Vtill
runV counter to tKe purpoVeV of tKe $ct anG JoalV of tKe 6EC
49
BecauVe manipulation actionV inYolYe frauGulent conGuct, tKey muVt Ee
pleG witK particularity anG Vpecificity
0
CourtV KaYe, KoweYer, rela[eG tKe
Vpecificity VtanGarGV for manipulation aV oppoVeG to miVVtatement anG
omiVVion claimV, aV tKey KaYe recoJni]eG tKat manipulation can inYolYe
factV Volely in tKe GefenGant¶V poVVeVVion
1
'eVpite tKiV recoJnition of an
4 1 U6C  ME 2012
44 1 CFR  24010E 201
4. See ErnVt & ErnVt Y +ocKfelGer, 42 U6 1, 20 19
4 6anta Fe ,nGuV, ,nc Y *reen, 40 U6 42, 4± 19
4. See Cent Bank of 'enYer, N$ Y FirVt ,nterVtate Bank of 'enYer, N$., 11 U6 14,
1 1994 VtatinJ tKat 6ection 10E ³proKiEitV only tKe makinJ of a material miVVtatement or
omiVVion or tKe commiVVion of a manipulatiYe act´
4 6Karette Y CreGit 6uiVVe ,nt¶l, 12 F 6upp G 0,  6'NY 201
49 One of tKe JoalV of tKe $ct, anG tKuV tKe 6EC, iV to enVure tKat inYeVtorV KaYe acceVV to tKe
Vame information wKen makinJ inYeVtment GeciVionV See Santa Fe Indus., 40 U6 at 4
³>7@Ke funGamental purpoVe of tKe $ct >iV@ µto VuEVtitute a pKiloVopKy of full GiVcloVure for tKe
pKiloVopKy of caYeat emptor    ¶´ TuotinJ $ffiliateG Ute Citi]enV of UtaK Y UniteG 6tateV, 40
U6 12, 11 192 Naturally, tKe iGea of one party manipulatinJ priceV unEeknownVt to otKer
traGerV iV Gifficult to VTuare witK tKiV Joal
0 7Ke 3riYate 6ecuritieV LitiJation Reform $ct 36LR$ anG Rule 9E of tKe FeGeral RuleV
of CiYil 3roceGure reTuire plaintiffV ErinJinJ actionV for VecuritieV law YiolationV anG frauG to
reVpectiYely pleaG witK KeiJKteneG particularity anG Vpecificity See 1 U6C  u4E1
2012 FE' R C,V 3 9E
1 $76, Commc¶nV, ,nc Y 6Kaar FunG, LtG, 49 FG , 102 2G Cir 200
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informational aVymmetry, courtV KaYe Vtill VtreVVeG tKe importance of tKe
Vcienter reTuirement, witK one court notinJ tKat ³in Vome caVeV Vcienter iV
tKe only factor tKat GiVtinJuiVKeV leJitimate traGinJ from improper
manipulation´
2
7Ke pleaGinJ reTuirementV anG empKaViV on Vcienter alreaGy make
ErinJinJ market manipulation claimV aJainVt Kuman actorV Gifficult,

Eut
tKe inYolYement of Elack Eo[ $, will only furtKer oEfuVcate tKe VearcK for
intent 6mokinJJun eYiGence iV not alwayV neceVVary aV courtV KaYe
recoJni]eG tKat in inVtanceV of claVVic manipulation, eJ, waVK ValeV, ³>t@Ke
GefenGant¶V manipulatiYe intent can Ee inferreG from tKe conGuct itVelf´
4
+oweYer, Vince manipulation can Ee effectuateG tKrouJK otKerwiVe
leJitimate tranVactionV, wKicK Go not reYeal intent tKemVelYeV, more
comple[ formV of manipulation EeyonG tKe VKort liVt of claVVic e[ampleV
miJKt Ee more Gifficult to Getect

$V GiVcuVVeG, $, VyVtemV will only
compounG tKiV comple[ity proElem

,n tKe aEVence of intent, it miJKt tKen
Ee fair to aVk wKetKer an $, GeYeloper knew tKere waV a GanJer tKat tKeir
macKine miJKt traGe manipulatiYely anG faileG to aGGreVV it 7KiV TueVtion
eVVentially aVkV wKetKer tKe GeYeloper waV reckleVV

,t iV VettleG law tKat reckleVVneVV can VatiVfy tKe Vcienter reTuirement for
6ection 10E claimV ErouJKt for miVVtatementV anG omiVVionV

KoweYer,
Gue to Vcienter¶V critical role in GifferentiatinJ manipulatiYe from leJitimate
traGinJ, Vome VuJJeVt tKat it can only Ee VatiVfieG Ey a finGinJ of intent anG
not mere reckleVVneVV
9
,f courtV aJree, tKe pleaGinJ reTuirementV,
informational aVymmetrieV, anG tKe Elack Eo[ proElem toJetKer will likely
2. Id.
. See id.
4 6EC Y MaVri, 2 F 6upp 2G 1,  6'NY 200
. See ATSI Commc’ns, 49 FG, at 102 notinJ tKat ³in Vome caVeV Vcienter iV tKe only
factor tKat GiVtinJuiVKeV leJitimate traGinJ from improper manipulation´
 7KiV iV not VpeculatiYe, aV KiJKfreTuency electronic traGinJ VyVtemV KaYe JiYen riVe to
new formV of manipulation like ³pinJinJ´ anG ³VpoofinJ´ See 7om C: Lin, The New Market
Manipulation,  EMORY LJ 12, 12±90 201 MoreoYer, tKeVe VyVtemV are merely
automateG, anG Go not neceVVarily create tKe Elack Eo[ proElem tKat autonomouV traGerV will See
JoneV, supra note 21
 :Kile tKe circuitV Go not conform to one Gefinition of reckleVVneVV, tKe 6econG Circuit
GefineV it aV ³conGuct wKicK iV KiJKly unreaVonaEle anG wKicK repreVentV an e[treme Geparture
from tKe VtanGarGV of orGinary care    to tKe e[tent tKat tKe GanJer waV eitKer known to tKe
GefenGant or Vo oEYiouV tKat tKe GefenGant muVt KaYe Eeen aware of it´ NoYak Y .aVakV, 21
FG 00, 0 2G Cir 2000 internal Tuotation markV omitteG TuotinJ Rolf Y BlytK, EaVtman
'illon & Co ,nc, 0 F2G , 4 2G Cir 19
. See 7ellaEV, ,nc Y Makor ,VVueV & RiJKtV, LtG, 1 U6 0, 19 n 200
acknowleGJinJ tKat eacK Circuit accepteG tKat reckleVVneVV coulG VatiVfy tKe 6ection 10E
Vcienter reTuirement Eut recoJni]inJ tKat tKe CircuitV GiffereG on tKe GeJree of reckleVVneVV
reTuireG
9 'aYiG YereV et al, U.S. Market Manipulation: Has Congress Given the CFTC Greater
Latitude than the SEC to Prosecute Open Market Trading as Unlawful Manipulation? It’s
Doubtful,  NO  FU7URE6&'ER,V$7,VE6 L RE3 NL 1 June 201
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poVe an inVurmountaEle KurGle for plaintiffV attemptinJ to alleJe
manipulation Ey $, traGerV
B 6ECON'ARY LIABILITYUN'ER T+EACT
7Ke poor fit of 6ection 10E to $, conGuct raiVeV a TueVtion aV to tKe
inKerent fairneVV of employinJ an $, traGer in tKe firVt place if certain actV
are manipulatiYe, wKy VKoulG anyEoGy EeViGeV tKe party wKo VtooG to Jain
from tKe $,¶V efficiencieV Eear tKe coVt of itV actionV wKen it impairV
otKerV in tKe market" 4ueVtionV in tKiV Yein are not uncommon tKrouJKout
tKe law,
0
anG leJiVlatureV anG MuGJeV KaYe accorGinJly enacteG anG applieG
VeconGary liaEility to aGGreVV tKeVe concernV in multiple conte[tV 7KiV
concern waV tKe motiYation EeKinG 6ection 20a of tKe $ct, wKicK createV
Moint anG VeYeral liaEility for ³>e@Yery perVon wKo, Girectly or inGirectly,
controlV any perVon liaEle´ unGer tKe ruleV or reJulationV promulJateG
unGer tKe $ct
1
6ection 20a waV enacteG ³to preYent people anG entitieV
from uVinJ Vtraw partieV, VuEViGiarieV, or otKer aJentV actinJ on tKeir EeKalf
to accompliVK enGV tKat woulG Ee forEiGGen Girectly Ey tKe VecuritieV
lawV´
2
6ection 20a reTuireV only tKat tKe VeconGarily liaEle party KaYe
control oYer tKe primary actor, not Vcienter

7KuV, 6ection 20a VeemV
like an attractiYe option for eVtaEliVKinJ liaEility witKout confrontinJ tKe
Vcienter proElem for tKoVe wKo uVe manipulatiYe macKineV aV Vtraw partieV
+oweYer, tKere iV one JlarinJ iVVue²tKere muVt Ee a primary Yiolation
performeG witK Vcienter to eVtaEliVK VeconGary control perVon liaEility,
wKicK leaGV Eack to tKe initial proElem of intent
4
MoreoYer, tKe 6upreme Court KaV forecloVeG priYate cauVeV of action
for aiGinJ anG aEettinJ primary 6ection 10E YiolatorV,

tKuV cloVinJ off
any potential commonlaw aYenue of relief tKat miJKt Ee trieG in orGer to
0 ³>,@t iV tKouJKt fair tKat one wKo EenefitV from tKe enterpriVe anG KaV a riJKt to control tKe
pKyVical actiYitieV of tKoVe wKo make tKe enterpriVe profitaEle, VKoulG pay for tKe pKyVical Karm
reVultinJ from tKe errorV anG GerelictionV of tKe VerYantV wKile GoinJ tKe kinG of tKinJ wKicK
makeV tKe enterpriVe VucceVVful´ RE67$7EMEN7 6ECON' OF $*ENCY  11 cmt a $M L$:
,N67 19 comparinJ tKe maVterVerYant anG principalaJent relationVKipV anG notinJ tKat
liaEility for maVterV anG principalV iV EaVeG on a Vimilar puElic policy
1 1 U6C  ta 2012
2 Laperriere Y VeVta ,nV *rp, ,nc., 2 FG 1, 21 11tK Cir 200 citinJ +R RE3
NO 12, at 12 19
. See 3aracor Fin, ,nc Y *en Elec Capital Corp., 9 FG 111, 111 9tK Cir 199
KolGinJ tKat ³tKe plaintiff neeG not VKow tKe controllinJ perVon¶V Vcienter or tKat tKey µculpaEly
participateG¶ in tKe alleJeG wronJGoinJ´
4 Mi]]aro Y +ome 'epot, ,nc, 44 FG 120, 12 11tK Cir 200 ³BecauVe a primary
Yiolation of tKe VecuritieV lawV iV an eVVential element of a  20a GeriYatiYe claim, we KaYe KelG
tKat a plaintiff aGeTuately pleaGV a  20a claim only if tKe primary Yiolation iV aGeTuately
pleaGeG´
. See Cent Bank of 'enYer, N$ Y FirVt ,nterVtate Bank of 'enYer, N$., 11 U6 14,
191 1994
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aYoiG tKe Vtatutory reTuirementV of 6ection 20a

$nG wKile courtV KaYe
recoJni]eG tKat tKere may Ee multiple primary YiolatorV witK Vmaller roleV
in a larJer manipulatiYe VcKeme,

eacK Yiolator muVt Vtill perform Vome
³manipulatiYe act´ witK Vcienter to Ee founG liaEle unGer 6ection 10E anG
Rule 10E

7KuV, any attemptV to eVtaEliVK liaEility unGer a VeconGary or
multiple actorV tKeory leaG Eack to tKe Vcienter proElem, anG tKe
manipulatiYe $, VlipV tKrouJK tKe Vtatutory crackV
C OPTION6 BEYON' 6ECTION6 B AN' A
'eVpite tKe eVtaEliVKeG utility of 6ectionV 10E anG 20a, manipulatiYe
actiYity miJKt Vtill Ee GeterreG or litiJateG unGer Gifferent reJulationV *iYen





CommoGity FutureV 7raGinJ CommiVVion CF7C,
1
anG Financial ,nGuVtry ReJulatory $utKority F,NR$
2
KaYe taken VtepV to
reJulate Kow market participantV GeYelop anG uVe tKeir traGinJ tecKnoloJy
7KiV allowV reJulatorV to ³comEat tKe new VcKemeV of market manipulation
wKile ViGeVteppinJ tKe tKorny iVVue of Vcienter´

For inVtance, in actionV
ErouJKt unGer 6EC Rule 1c, tKe 6EC neeG only proYe tKat a GefenGant
faileG to ³eVtaEliVK riVk manaJement controlV tKat are reasonably GeViJneG
 7KiV iV not to VuJJeVt tKat claimV unGer aiGinJanGaEettinJ liaEility woulG not ultimately
Vuffer tKe Vame fate for tKe fact tKat tKere iV no primary Yiolation or EecauVe aiGinJ anG aEettinJ
reTuireV ³knowinJ´ proYiVion of aVViVtance See Rolf Y BlytK, EaVtman 'illon & Co, ,nc., 0
F2G , 4 2G Cir 19
 6ection 10E makeV it unlawful for people to Yiolate tKe enumerateG conGuct ³Girectly or
inGirectly´ 1 U6C  M 2012 see City of 3roYiGence Y B$76 *loE MktV, ,nc.,  FG
, 1 2G Cir 201 ³>,@n any comple[ VecuritieV frauG    tKere are likely to Ee multiple
YiolatorV, anG eYen an entity tKat playV a VeconGary role in a VecuritieV frauG caVe may Ee KelG
liaEle aV a primary Yiolator´ internal Tuotation markV anG citationV omitteG
. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 11 U6 at 191
9. See, e.g., Lin, supra note , at 120±1 GeVcriEinJ tKe ³FlaVK CraVK,´ an eYent in 2010 in
wKicK an automateG traGinJ VyVtem e[ecutinJ orGerV witKout reVpect to price or time limitV cauVeG
1 trillion in market Yalue to YaniVK from tKe U6 Vtock market in tKirty minuteV
0 Merrill LyncK, 3ierce, Fenner & 6mitK ,nc, E[cKanJe $ct ReleaVe No ,929, ,nYeVtment
Company $ct ReleaVe No 4, 201 :L 114 6ept 2, 201 6EC action ErouJKt aJainVt
party tKat alleJeGly faileG to implement reaVonaEle riVk manaJement VyVtemV unGer Rule 1c
1 *reJory 6copino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of
Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 
FL$ L REV 221, 2 201 GiVcuVVinJ Kow CF7C Rule 1 will potentially ³Ee an effectiYe
weapon aJainVt >alJoritKmic traGinJ@ tKat GiVruptV or manipulateV GeriYatiYe marketV EecauVe   
GeciVionV analy]inJ ReJulation 1 appear to apply a reaVonaEleneVV VtanGarG aV oppoVeG to a
Vcienter reTuirement´
2 ,n orGer to minimi]e riVkV of alJoritKmic manipulation, F,NR$ now reTuireV tKoVe
³primarily reVponViEle for tKe GeViJn, GeYelopment or ViJnificant moGification of alJoritKmic
traGinJ VtrateJieV´ to reJiVter aV VecuritieV traGerV See F,NR$, ReJulatory Notice 10
ReJiVtration of $VVociateG 3erVon :Ko 'eYelop $lJoritKmic 7raGinJ 6trateJieV Mar 201,
KttpwwwfinraorJViteVGefaultfileVnoticeBGocBfileBrefNoticeBReJulatoryB10pGf
. See Lin, supra note , at 10
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to preYent´ certain tranVactionV
4
:Kile tKeVe reJulationV miJKt proKiEit
Vome manipulatiYe conGuct, tKey are inVufficient for VeYeral reaVonV
FirVt, tKeVe reJulationV only coYer certain market participantV tKat
reJiVter witK reJulatorV, like ErokerGealerV, anG not all potential
manipulatorV neeG Ee reJiVtrantV

Normally, 6ection 10E iV referreG to aV
a ³catcKall´ EecauVe it applieV to any perVon enJaJinJ in manipulatiYe or
GeceptiYe conGuct, Eut aV GiVcuVVeG in 6ection ,,$, it iV not reaGily
applicaEle to $, conGuct

6econG, YiolationV of 6ection 1c of tKe $ct
Go not JiYe riVe to priYate cauVeV of action leaYinJ inGiYiGualV witKout a
remeGy for loVVeV Gue to manipulation

Finally, VtanGarGV EaVeG in
reaVonaEleneVV Go not Jo far enouJK JuVt aV a Elack Eo[ may not proYiGe
any information aEout itV GeYeloper¶V intent, it may not proYiGe any uVeful
eYiGence reJarGinJ tKe GeYeloper¶V reaVonaEleneVV eitKer

7Kerefore, tKiV
Note contenGV tKat reJulationV VKoulG affirmatiYely reTuire GeYeloperV to
Jenerate meaninJful feeGEack from tKeir $, ConVeTuently, tKe Kuman
reVponVe to tKat feeGEack²anG not tKe actionV or Vtructure of tKe $,
itVelf²will proYiGe tKe EaViV for any potential liaEility analyVeV
III CREATIN* RE*ULATORY 6OLUTION6 T+REE
4UE6TION6
7KiV 3art GiVcuVVeV tKree VtepV tKat can Ee taken to preYent $,
manipulation anG enforce actionV aJainVt manipulatiYe $, traGerV FirVt,
tKe 6upreme Court muVt Vettle a circuit Vplit aV to wKat conGuct actually
conVtituteV manipulation 6econG, an appropriate reJulatory EoGy anG
framework muVt Ee VelecteG for creatinJ $, GeYelopment VtanGarGV tKat
will fit comfortaEly witK tKe current 6ection 10E Goctrine 7KirG, tKe
4 Merrill LyncK, 3ierce, Fenner & 6mitK ,nc, 201 :L 114, at 1 6EC action ErouJKt
aJainVt party tKat alleJeGly faileG to implement reaVonaEle riVk manaJement VyVtemV unGer Rule
1c
 :Kile market manipulation actionV often inYolYe ErokerGealerV VuEMect to ruleV
promulJateG unGer 6ection 1 of tKe $ct, manipulationV alVo often incluGe otKer partieV, like larJe
VKareKolGerV, wKoVe conGuct miJKt not neceVVarily Ee coYereG unGer 6EC ruleV See RaMeVK .
$JJarwal & *uoMun :u, Stock Market Manipulations, 9 J BU6 191, 19 200 finGinJ tKat
in 142 caVeV for manipulation ErouJKt Ey tKe 6EC, larJe VKareKolGerV witK at leaVt  eTuity
ownerVKip were inYolYeG in 19 of tKe caVeV
. See YaGaY, supra note 1, at 104±44 GiVcuVVion supra 6ection ,,$
 :Kile no feGeral caVeV aGGreVV cauVeV of action unGer Rule 1c, courtV KaYe founG tKat
otKer ruleV promulJateG unGer 6ection 1c of tKe $ct Go not JiYe riVe to a priYate cauVe of
action, notinJ tKat ³tKe 6upreme Court µpreVumeV tKat, wKen a Vtatute containV an enforcement
mecKaniVm Eut GoeV not e[preVVly proYiGe a priYate remeGy, ConJreVV GiG not mean to permit
priYate enforcement of tKe Vtatute¶´ See +arriV Y 7' $meritraGe, ,nc, 0 FG 4,  tK
Cir 201 TuotinJ MicK Corr OrJ Y MicK 'ep¶t of Corr, 4 FG 9, 90 tK Cir 2014
 CKaJalFeferkorn, supra note , at 1 ³>$@utonomouV alJoritKmV now make cKoiceV
tKat are not proJrammeG Ey tKeir GeYeloperV anG tKat are not foreVeeaEle Ey tKem, at leaVt witK
reVpect to a larJe VuEVet of all poVViEle VcenarioV 7Kerefore, tKere iV no perfect eTuiYalence
Eetween proJrammerV¶ anG alJoritKmV¶ cKoiceV, anG tKe alJoritKmV¶ cKoiceV KaYe an inGepenGent
meaninJ´
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reJulatory EoGy muVt inform itVelf of $, inGuVtry capaEilitieV to create
reJulationV tKat are EotK accurate anG efficient in practice
A +OW 6+OUL'WE'EFINEMANIPULATION"
Before reJulatorV can create VtanGarGV for GetectinJ $, manipulation,
it will Ee neceVVary to Gefine market manipulation for Kuman anG $,
actorV alike 6ome conGuct iV claVVically manipulatiYe, like tKe waVK ValeV
GeVcriEeG in tKe 6ection ,B KypotKetical
9
For conGuct tKat GoeV not fit tKe
claVVic molG, KoweYer, tKe VuEMectiYe intent reTuirement KaV alreaGy leG
circuitV to GiVaJree oYer wKat Kuman actionV conVtitute manipulation
0
$V
GiVcuVVeG aEoYe, $, traGerV will only complicate tKiV proElem wKen tKey
ineYitaEly participate in traGinJ
1
7Kerefore, in reVolYinJ tKiV Vplit, tKe
6upreme Court VKoulG not only conViGer intentfinGinJ proElemV in tKe
conte[t of Kuman action, Eut alVo in tKe conte[t of $, action Only tKen
can reJulatorV focuV reVourceV on GetectinJ conGuct tKat iV actually
proKiEiteG, ratKer tKan conGuct tKat iV acceptaEle in Vome circuitV Eut not
otKerV
Currently, circuit courtV Jenerally aJree tKat ³>t@Ke JraYamen of
manipulation iV Geception of inYeVtorV into EelieYinJ tKat priceV at wKicK
tKey purcKaVe anG Vell VecuritieV are GetermineG Ey tKe natural interplay of
Vupply anG GemanG, not riJJeG Ey manipulatorV´
2
7ranVactionV affectinJ
price are not neceVVarily manipulatiYe, KoweYer, aV ConJreVV noteG in
paVVinJ tKe $ct, ³if a perVon iV merely tryinJ to acTuire a larJe Elock of
Vtock for inYeVtment, or GeVireV to GiVpoVe of a EiJ KolGinJ, KiV knowleGJe
tKat in GoinJ Vo Ke will affect tKe market price GoeV not make KiV action
unlawful´

BeyonG tKeVe Jeneral principleV are wKere circuitV Vplit
4
7Ke 7KirG
Circuit KaV KelG tKat liaEility for leJal tranVactionV e[ecuteG witK
manipulatiYe intent alVo reTuireV a VKowinJ tKat tKe accuVeG ³inMecteG
inaccurate information into tKe market´

+oweYer, in SEC v. Masri, a
court in tKe 6outKern 'iVtrict of New York founG tKat 6econG Circuit
preceGent VuJJeVteG a contrary reVult

7Ke actV in TueVtion in Masri
9. See supra 6ection ,B
0. See 6EC Y MaVri, 2 F 6upp 2G 1,  6'NY 200 GiVcuVVinJ tKe circuit Vplit
1 CalYello, supra note 2 claiminJ tKat ³from tKiV point forwarG, eYery otKer aVVet manaJer
muVt eitKer GefenG itV current approacK to actiYe manaJement or follow BlackRock¶V leaG,´ after
BlackRock announceG a piYot towarGV uVinJ $, in itV traGinJ GeciVionV
2 $ltKouJK tKe 7KirG anG 6econG CircuitV are GiYiGeG aV to wKat typeV of conGuct can
conVtitute manipulation, tKey aJree on a Jeneral Gefinition of manipulation See *FL $GYantaJe
FunG, LtG Y Colkitt, 22 FG 19, 20 G Cir 2001 TuotinJ *urary Y :ineKouVe, 190 FG
, 4 2G Cir 1999
. See 6 RE3 NO 92, at 1 194
4. Compare Fe]]ani Y Bear, 6tearnV & Co ,nc,  FG  2G Cir 201, with GFL
Advantage Fund, 22 FG 19
. See GFL Advantage Fund, 22 FG at 20
. See 6EC Y MaVri, 2 F 6upp 2G 1, 1±2 6'NY 200
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inYolYeG ³markinJ tKe cloVe´ or ³tKe practice of repeateGly e[ecutinJ tKe
laVt tranVaction of tKe Gay in a Vecurity in orGer to affect itV cloVinJ price´

7Ke GefenGant alleJeGly KaG an incentiYe to force a Vecurity¶V price upwarG
in orGer to aYoiG tKe conVeTuenceV of a Getrimental contract option fi[eG to
tKe price

7Ke court KelG tKat tKeVe otKerwiVe leJal traGeV coulG conVtitute
manipulation if performeG witK manipulatiYe intent
9
,n analy]inJ tKe
circuit Vplit, tKe court recoJni]eG tKat tKe 7KirG Circuit¶V ³inMection of
inaccurate information´ reTuirement waV likely a reVult of MuGicial
GiVcomfort witK YiolationV EaVeG on intent alone
90
'eVpite tKe inKerent proElemV in eYiGencinJ intent, tKiV Note contenGV
tKat tKe 7KirG Circuit¶V rule reTuirinJ manipulatiYe tranVactionV to Ee
accompanieG Ey aGGitional Geception to Ee actionaEle iV unneceVVary anG
ultimately incorrect
91
7o tKe e[tent tKat manipulatiYe tranVactionV alone
can miVleaG inYeVtorV, tKey are e[actly tKe type of conGuct tKe $ct VouJKt to
proKiEit
92
Masri itVelf acknowleGJeG tKiV principle anG recoJni]eG tKat tKe
inMection of inaccurate information reTuireG Ey tKe 7KirG Circuit coulG
eVVentially Ee accompliVKeG Ey manipulatiYe tranVactionV tKemVelYeV
9
ConJreVV purpoVefully GiVtinJuiVKeG Eetween manipulation anG Geceit in
6ection 10E
94
EYen tKouJK manipulation actionV miJKt commonly
inYolYe furtKer Geception, manipulation muVt repreVent Vome GiVtinctly
proKiEiteG conGuct otKerwiVe, itV incluVion in tKe Vtatute woulG Ee
VuperfluouV
9
7Kerefore, tKe 6upreme Court VKoulG reVolYe tKe current circuit Vplit Ey
aGoptinJ tKe Masri KolGinJ FurtKermore, tKe 6upreme Court VKoulG Go Vo
promptly EecauVe Masri noteG tKat, GeVpite tKe Vplit, tKe 6EC waV
neYertKeleVV ErinJinJ actionV Volely for leJitimate actiYitieV coupleG witK
alleJeGly manipulatiYe intent
9
7KiV GiYerJence Eetween enforcement anG
. See id. at 
. See id. at 2
9. See id.
90. See id. at 
91. See id. at 1±2
92 6EC Y Lek 6ec Corp, 2 F 6upp G 49, 9 6'NY 201 ³>O@ne of tKe
funGamental JoalV of tKe feGeral VecuritieV lawV iV to promote tranVparency²tKat iV, µto preYent
practiceV tKat impair tKe function of Vtock marketV in enaElinJ people to Euy anG Vell VecuritieV at
priceV tKat reflect unGiVtorteG tKouJK not neceVVarily accurate eVtimateV of tKe unGerlyinJ
economic Yalue of tKe VecuritieV traGeG¶´
9. See Masri, 2 F 6upp 2G at 2 n1
94. See 1 U6C  M 2012 ³,t VKall Ee unlawful for any perVon, Girectly or inGirectly   
E >t@o uVe or employ, in connection witK tKe purcKaVe or Vale of any Vecurity    any
manipulatiYe or GeceptiYe GeYice´ empKaViV aGGeG
9. But see 6cKreiEer Y BurlinJton N, ,nc, 42 U6 1, ± 19 ³ConJreVV uVeG tKe
pKraVe µmanipulatiYe or GeceptiYe¶ in  10E    anG we KaYe interpreteG µmanipulatiYe¶ in tKat
conte[t to reTuire miVrepreVentation´ *iYen tKat tKe CircuitV are Vtill currently Vplit, it iV not
clear wKetKer otKerwiVe leJitimate traGinJ actiYity coulG create tKiV miVrepreVentation if
performeG witK manipulatiYe intent
9. See Masri, 2 F 6upp 2G at 
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MuGicial interpretation proYiGeV poor notice of wKat EeKaYior iV acceptaEle,
9
anG reJarGleVV of Kow tKe 6upreme Court reVolYeV tKe Vplit, market
participantV are entitleG to know wKere tKey VtanG witK tKe 6EC
7Ke 6upreme Court VKoulG alVo aGopt tKe remainGer of tKe Masri
court¶V KolGinJ tKat ³in orGer to impoVe liaEility for an open market
tranVaction, tKe 6EC muVt proYe tKat but for tKe manipulatiYe intent, tKe
GefenGant woulG not KaYe conGucteG tKe tranVaction´
9
7Ke court reaVoneG,
inter alia, tKat eYen if a tranVaction KaV tKe foreVeeaEle effect of increaVinJ
or GecreaVinJ a Vecurity¶V price in a way tKat faYorV a traGer, if tKe traGer
KaV Vome otKer leJitimate inYeVtment purpoVe for tranVactinJ, it cannot Ee
VaiG tKat tKey are ³artificially´ affectinJ tKe price
99
,n aGGition to tKe fact
tKat tKiV flowV loJically from tKe Masri KolGinJ anG reflectV leJiVlatiYe
intent, tKe 6upreme Court VKoulG alVo aGopt tKiV teVt EecauVe it will Ee
conGuciYe to GetermininJ tKe intent of tKe $, traGerV tKat will ineYitaEly
participate in VecuritieV marketV
$V GiVcuVVeG, Jenerally aVkinJ ³wKy´ an $, macKine maGe a JiYen
GeciVion iV impracticaEle
100
,nVteaG, tKe ³Eut for´ Masri formulation VetV
parameterV for a narrower, KypotKetical macKine teVt if macKine inputV tKat
are preGictiYe of a ViJnificant price impact are aGMuVteG to inVteaG repreVent
a neJliJiEle impact, will tKe macKine Vtill tranVact" :Kile tKiV teVt tKe
Masri teVt makeV it no eaVier to finG Kuman intent, current metKoGV of
macKine interpretaEility miJKt actually Ee aEle to proYiGe inViJKt into tKiV
narrower TueVtion for $, GeciVionV
For inVtance, tKe Masri teVt miJKt Ee e[ecuteG witK metKoGV like Local
,nterpretaEle MoGel$JnoVtic E[planationV L,ME L,ME operateV Ey
moGifyinJ ³a VinJle Gata Vample Ey tweakinJ tKe feature YalueV anG
oEVerY>inJ@ tKe reVultinJ impact on tKe output,´
101
anG returninJ a liVt of
YariaEleV tKat were moVt GeterminatiYe of tKe output ,n termV of
interpretaEility, tKiV iV often ³relateG to wKat KumanV are intereVteG in wKen
oEVerYinJ tKe output of a moGel´
102
,n tKe worGV of L,ME¶V creator, tKiV
VimplifieV tKe taVk of JeneratinJ an e[planation EecauVe ³eYen really
9 Fo[ et al, supra note , at 122 recoJni]inJ tKat petitionerV to tKe 6upreme Court KaYe
accurately VtateG tKat ³tKe current Vplit amonJ tKe feGeral circuitV createV ViJnificant confuVion for
market participantV anG GiVparitieV of outcome for tKoVe accuVeG´
9. See Masri, 2 F 6upp 2G at 2
99. Id. at  For inVtance, in Masri, tKe court noteG tKat increaVeG traGinJ Eefore market
cloVe coulG Vimply Ee Gue to tKe fact tKat ³traGerV monitor actiYity anG tKeir poVitionV tKrouJKout
tKe Gay Eefore conGuctinJ tKeir traGeV´ Id. at 0
100. See Lilian EGwarGV & MicKael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 1 'U.E L & 7EC+ REV 1,
± 201 GiVcuVVinJ tKe ³tranVparency fallacy´ anG wKy certain information tKat pertainV to
Kow a macKine makeV a GeciVion iV actually unlikely to Ee uVeful for a perVon VeekinJ reGreVV for
an improper macKine GeciVion
101 LarV +ulVtaert, Understanding model predictions with LIME, ME',UM July 11, 201,
KttpVtowarGVGataVciencecomunGerVtanGinJmoGelpreGictionVwitKlimea2fGffaE
102. Id.
14 BROO. J COR3 F,N & COM L >Vol 14
complicateG moGelV are not tKat complicateG in a fi[eG neiJKEorKooG,´ or
tKe Vpace VurrounGinJ a VinJle Gata Vample
10
,n tKe caVe of market
manipulation, tKiV woulG inYolYe a focuV on tKe YariaEleV relateG to tKe
anticipateG cKanJe in market price
104
$GGitionally, inVofar aV L,ME only
perturEV inputV to oEVerYe outputV, it iV ³moGelaJnoVtic,´ or pliaEle to a
ranJe of macKine VtructureV
10
$GGitionally, L,ME reTuireV no acceVV to
traininJ Gata to return an e[planation
10
OtKerV miJKt recoJni]e tKat tKe Masri teVt coulG potentially Ee
anVwereG witK ³cloVeVtworlG´ counterfactual TueVtionV, wKicK aVk ³Kow
tKe worlG woulG KaYe to Ee Gifferent for a GeViraEle outcome to occur´
10
$caGemicV KaYe noteG Kow anVwerV to ³cloVeVtworlG´ counterfactual
TueVtionV can Ee ³efficiently anG effectiYely computeG Ey applyinJ VtanGarG
tecKniTueV, eYen to cuttinJeGJe arcKitectureV´ in $, macKineV
10
RatKer
tKan JeneratinJ a liVt of YariaEleV rankeG Ey importance like L,ME, tKiV
metKoG returnV a KypotKetical Vcenario in wKicK tKe VliJKteVt cKanJe of
inputV woulG yielG a ³cloVeVt poVViEle worlG´ wKere tKe outcome iV
Gifferent
109
Once aJain, a reVult alterinJ tKe YariaEleV affectinJ market
price impact woulG Ee releYant to a manipulation Getermination MoreoYer,
like L,ME, tKiV metKoG GoeV not reTuire an unGerVtanGinJ of tKe macKine¶V
innerworkinJV
110
7KeVe metKoGV may not yielG perfect reVultV, Eut tKey GemonVtrate tKat
loJical formulationV of leJal VtanGarGV, like tKe Masri teVt, miJKt proYiGe
more meaninJful information aEout $, GeciVionV ,n any eYent, tKey Jo
10 .yle 3olicK, Trusting Machine Learning Models with LIME, '$7$ 6.E37,C,
KttpVGataVkepticcomEloJtranVcriptV201truVtinJmacKinelearninJmoGelVwitKlime
poGcaVt anG tranVcript containinJ interYiew witK Marco RiEerio, L,ME creator
104 7KiV Note aVVumeV tKat market conGitionV anG tKe anticipateG traGe cKaracteriVticV can Ee
uVeG to calculate impact on market price witK Vome accuracy 7KiV iV not conViGereG to Ee
unrealiVtic, aV tKe National $VVociation of 6ecuritieV 'ealerV N$6' anG tKe New York 6tock
E[cKanJe NY6E KaYe reTuireG inYeVtment aGYiVerV to conViGer tKe market impact of a JiYen
tranVaction aV part of tKeir Guty of ³EeVt e[ecution´ See .ur] Y FiG MJmt & ReVearcK Co, No
0±CV±09±J3*, 200 :L 292, at 2 6' ,ll June 10, 200 e[plaininJ factorV releYant
to tKe Guty of EeVt e[ecution
10 +ulVtaert, supra note 101
10 3olicK, supra note 10
10 ConViGer a macKine tKat makeV a GeciVion EaVeG on a numEer of input factorV
Counterfactual TueVtionV eVVentially ³aVk´ tKe macKine wKat cKanJe in inputV woulG KaYe yielGeG
a Gifferent GeciVion :Kile GraVtically cKanJinJ all of tKe inputV miJKt yielG a Gifferent reVult, aV
an anVwer tKiV GoeV not ViJnal mucK aEout Kow tKe macKine ³tKinkV´ By inVteaG VeekinJ out tKe
³minimal amount of information capaEle of alterinJ a GeciVion,´ or tKe ³cloVeVtworlG´ in wKicK a
Gifferent GeciVion woulG Ee maGe, it iV poVViEle to Vee wKicK factorV were moVt critical to a
GeciVion See 6anGra :acKtera, Brent MittelVtaGt & CKriV RuVVell, Counterfactual Explanations
Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 1 +$RV JL & 7EC+
41, 44±4 201
10 $t tKe coVt of receiYinJ oYerly reVtrictiYe e[planationV, proponentV of tKe ³cloVeVt worlG´
counterfactual e[planationV offer tKeir metKoG aV an alternatiYe to metKoGV like L,ME, claiminJ
tKat tKeir counterfactualV proYiGe more interpretaEle reVultV See id. at 2
109. Id. at 44
110. Id. at 0
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EeyonG aVkinJ wKat tKe $, intenGeG to Go, Jenerally, anG aYoiG an
unneceVVary anG EurGenVome inYeVtiJation into tKe $,¶V traininJ KiVtory
anG arcKitecture
111
7KiV Note VuJJeVtV tKat in fielGV wKere $, iV replacinJ
or VupplementinJ Kuman GeciVion makinJ, courtV VKoulG VKape Kuman
centric inTuirieV into more loJical formulationV 7Ke 6upreme Court can Go
tKiV in tKe manipulation conte[t Ey aGoptinJ tKe Masri teVt anG take tKe firVt
Vtep towarGV tranVforminJ wKat KaV Eeen a KypotKetical TueVtion of intent
for KumanV into a GemonVtraEle matter of fact for future $, actorV 7KiV
will proYiGe Jreater clarity in GetermininJ if macKine conGuct iV
manipulatiYe, wKetKer Ey GiliJent GeYeloperV GurinJ uVe or Ey factfinGerV
e[amininJ conGuct in a courtroom after tKe fact $GGitionally, reJulatorV
can uVe tKeVe capaEilitieV aV tKe EaViV for practical e[pectationV in inGuVtry
reJulation
B W+ATRE*ULATORY FRAMEWORK 6+OUL' BEU6E' TO
O9ER6EEAI TRA'IN*"
:Kile tKe Masri teVt miJKt Ee uVeful for GetermininJ macKine intent,
$, GeYeloperV will Vtill KaYe no Vpecific oEliJationV to Masri teVt tKeir
macKineV witKout aGGitional reJulationV ,Geally, ConJreVV coulG EotK
coGify tKe Masri Gefinition anG eVtaEliVK cauVeV of action aJainVt
GeYeloperV of manipulatiYe $, inGepenGent of 6ection 10E
$lternatiYely, tKe 6EC coulG enact tKe Vame $, VtanGarGV aV ruleV anG
enforce tKem aJainVt certain partieV EaVeG on e[iVtinJ Vtatutory JrantV of
power from ConJreVV
112
,nVteaG, tKiV Note conViGerV Kow inGuVtry VtanGarGV for $, impoVeG Ey
6elfReJulatory OrJani]ationV 6ROV
11
or otKer inGuVtry autKoritieV coulG
Geter manipulation wKile alVo VupportinJ enforcement of 6ection 10E
actionV
114
7KeVe VtanGarGV woulG not replace 6ection 10E, Eut tKey woulG
proYiGe aGGitional affirmatiYe oEliJationV for market participantV anG
Jenerate a paper trail to proYiGe more releYant factV for potential 6ection
111. See EGwarGV & Veale, supra note 100, at ± GiVcuVVinJ tKe ³tranVparency fallacy´ anG
wKy certain information tKat pertainV to ³Kow´ a macKine makeV a GeciVion iV actually unlikely to
Ee uVeful for a perVon VeekinJ reGreVV for an improper macKine GeciVion
112 7Ke 6EC alreaGy reTuireV ErokerGealerV to eVtaEliVK VyVtemV to manaJe financial anG
reJulatory riVkV wKicK, in effect, proYiGe a mecKaniVm to Vtop Vome manipulatiYe EeKaYior See
YaGaY, supra note 1, at 10± 1 CFR  2401c 201
11 6ROV incluGe orJani]ationV like F,NR$, Vtock e[cKanJeV, anG clearinJ KouVeV See Self-
Regulatory Organization – SRO Definition, ,NVE67O3E',$, KttpVwwwinYeVtopeGiacom
termVVVroaVp laVt YiViteG 6ept 21, 2019
114 For e[ample, *$$3 YiolationV can Ee uVeG to eVtaEliVK an inference of Vcienter wKen otKer
³reG flaJV´ are iJnoreG See In re O[forG +ealtK 3lanV, ,nc 6ec LitiJ, 1 F 6upp 2G 290, 29±
9 6'NY 1999 CourtV KaYe alVo KelG tKat Yiolation of 6RO ruleV can proYiGe releYant
eYiGence for certain 6ection 10E actionV See *M6 *roup, LLC Y BenGerVon, 2 FG , 2
2G Cir 200 finGinJ tKat YiolationV of N$6' tKe preGeceVVor to F,NR$ may Ee conViGereG
releYant for purpoVeV of 6ection 10E unVuitaEility claimV
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10E manipulation claimV 7Ke analyViV of inGuVtry, aV oppoVeG to
JoYernmental, reJulation iV tKe focuV of tKiV Note for multiple reaVonV
FirVt, 6ection 10E KaV Eeen tKe EaViV for manipulation actionV for tKe
paVt eiJKty yearV, Vo MuGJeV are likely GepenGent on tKe 6ection 10E
Goctrine in tKe manipulation conte[t
11
RelateGly, ConJreVV iV unlikely to
create leJiVlation for a proElem tKat iV currently VpeculatiYe in nature
6econG, tKe proElem preVenteG Ey $, traGerV iV eYiGentiary anG not Vo
GiVtinct from tKe eYiGentiary proElem of proYinJ Kuman intent aV to reTuire
an entirely new Vtatute ,nGeeG, to tKe e[tent tKat macKine actionV could Ee
e[plaineG, tKere woulG Ee no reaVon to caVt aViGe tKe larJe EoGy of
inVtructiYe 6ection 10E Goctrine MuVt EecauVe a computer maGe tKe
GeciVionV in TueVtion
11
MoreoYer, for tKe Vame reaVon tKat tKe
lonJVtanGinJ EoGy of 6ection 10E caVe law proYiGeV Vome JuiGe for
leJality, new leJiVlation miJKt inYerVely Vuffer from MuGicial uncertainty
wKen tKe firVt actionV are ErouJKt, GeVpite wKateYer contemporary anG
inciViYe lanJuaJe GrafterV woulG uVe in a Vtatute
11
7KirG, tKere iV no VinJle market for VecuritieV, anG traGinJ inYolYeV
many intermeGiarieV 7KuV, commentatorV KaYe recoJni]eG tKat Vome
6ROV, like e[cKanJeV, are aGYantaJeouVly VituateG to reJulate tKe
tranVactionV tKey facilitate
11
$lVo, witKout a wiGer Jrant of autKority from
ConJreVV, tKe 6EC may not Ee aEle to impoVe affirmatiYe oEliJationV on all
woulGEe manipulatorV 7Kerefore, inGuVtry VtanGarGV miJKt reJulate a
wiGer ranJe of potential manipulatorV, wKile Vtill complementinJ 6ection
10E¶V function aV a ³catcKall´ proYiVion 7KiV aVVumeV tKat 6ection 10E
plaintiffV may put fortK eYiGence of a GefenGant¶V noncompliance witK
certain inGuVtry VtanGarGV in orGer to Kelp eVtaEliVK Vcienter
119
FourtK, reJulatinJ Yia 6ROV iV not only promiVinJ in tKeory Eut it iV
alVo realiVtic, aV 6ROV KaYe a perVonal incentiYe in VtoppinJ manipulation
3laintiffV KaYe KaG recent VucceVV in actionV aJainVt e[cKanJeV for
facilitatinJ alleJeG market manipulationV,
120
anG 6ROV VeekinJ to aYoiG a
Vimilar fate coulG Eenefit Ey proactiYely creatinJ tKeir own reJulationV
11. See Fo[ et al, supra note , at 12 ³>7@Ke common law MuriVpruGence of VecuritieV
manipulation KaV oYerwKelminJly GeYelopeG arounG Rule 10E :Kile tKe amEit of  9a2 iV
now wiGe, patK GepenGency VeemV to KaYe reVulteG in  10E, ratKer tKan  9a2, continuinJ to
Ee tKe reJulatorV¶ anG priYate litiJantV¶ Vtatute of cKoice´
11. See, e.g., In re FaceEook, ,nc, ,3O 6ec & 'eriYatiYe LitiJ, 9 F 6upp 2G 42
6'NY 201 finGinJ tKat tKe failure of an automateG traGinJ platform createG liaEility for tKe
e[cKanJe tKat GeYelopeG tKe platform, wKen tKe e[cKanJe iJnoreG teVtinJ tKat VuJJeVteG tKe
automateG VyVtem waV not prepareG for tKe orGer traffic tKat tKe e[cKanJe waV e[pectinJ
11. See, e.g., Lin, supra note , at 101 GiVcuVVinJ Kow reJulatorV uVinJ new JrantV of
autKority ³will Ee lackinJ in meaninJful preceGent in tKe near term, particularly on tKe iVVue of
Vcienter´
11. See, e.g., id. at 104
119. See caVeV citeG supra note 114
120. See City of 3roYiGence Y B$76 *loE MktV, ,nc.,  FG , 1 2G Cir 201 KolGinJ
tKat plaintiffinYeVtorV properly pleG claimV for market manipulation aJainVt tKe GefenGant Vtock
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LaVtly, wKetKer tKe VtanGarGV GiVcuVVeG Kerein are coGifieG in a Vtatute
or reJulateG Yia inGuVtry VtanGarGV, plaintiffV woulG preVent tKe Vame
eYiGence in eacK caVe 7Ke critical Gifference woulG Ee tKat a plaintiff
ErinJinJ a 6ection 10E action woulG KiJKliJKt a GefenGant¶V Geparture
from tKe inGuVtry VtanGarGV to proYe intent or reckleVVneVV, wKile a new
Vtatute miJKt allow for GeterminationV unGer a neJliJence VtanGarG
121
,n
otKer worGV, plaintiffV wKo coulG proYe Vcienter in a 6ection 10E caVe
woulG KaYe no Gifficulty proYinJ neJliJence unGer cuVtomi]eG VtatuteV
7Kerefore, conViGerinJ Kow Vcienter iVVueV woulG Ee reVolYeG in a 6ection
10E action proYiGeV a more compreKenViYe analyViV
ConViGerinJ tKe potential Karm tKat unreJulateG $, coulG cauVe in
certain conte[tV, Vome KaYe VuJJeVteG tKat an aJency akin to tKe FooG anG
'ruJ $GminiVtration F'$ VKoulG Ee cKarJeG witK JrantinJ premarket
approYal for alJoritKmV
122
Yet, in tKe conte[t of $, traGerV, premarket
approYal woulG proYiGe little Yalue Unlike GruJV tKat are teVteG for
preGictaEility, $,¶V inKerent utility comeV from tKe fact tKat it makeV
unpreGictaEle GeciVionV tKat KumanV cannot anticipate
12
$, alJoritKmV
alVo eYolYe aV tKey traGe, wKicK coulG Tuickly renGer prior approYal
meaninJleVV
124
MoreoYer, many macKineV miJKt not eYer encounter
opportunitieV for profitaEle manipulation
12
7KuV, tKe EenefitV of VcreeninJ
eacK $, traGinJ VyVtem woulG Ee far outweiJKeG Ey tKe aGminiVtratiYe
EurGen of a proceVV manGatinJ affirmatiYe, premarket approYal
7Ke F'$ VuJJeVtion iV neYertKeleVV inViJKtful for recoJni]inJ tKat
reJulatorV VKoulG Ee e[pertV witK an acute unGerVtanGinJ of tKe inGuVtry
:itK reVpect to JoYernment reJulation, KoweYer, a new aJency woulG not
Ee neceVVary for reJulatinJ $, traGerV, Vince tKe 6EC woulG alreaGy KaYe
tKe e[pertiVe anG capaEility to Go Vo MoreoYer, tKiV Note contenGV tKat
e[cKanJe, in alleJinJ tKat tKe Vtock e[cKanJe KaG committeG a manipulatiYe act Ey permittinJ
KiJKfreTuency traGerV to manipulate priceV Yia tKe Vtructure of tKe e[cKanJe
121. See, e.g., Merrill LyncK, 3ierce, Fenner & 6mitK ,nc, E[cKanJe $ct ReleaVe No ,929,
,nYeVtment $GYiVorV $ct No 4, 201 :L 114 6ept 2, 201 ErinJinJ an enforcement
action aJainVt a GefenGant for failure to implement reasonable VafeJuarGV in accorGance witK Rule
1c
122. See generally $nGrew 7utt, An FDA for Algorithms, 9 $'M,N L REV  201
12. See BatKaee, supra note 4, at 90 ³>:@e may Ee aEle to tell wKat tKe $,¶V oYerarcKinJ
Joal waV, Eut ElackEo[ $, may Go tKinJV in wayV tKe creatorV of tKe $, may not unGerVtanG or Ee
aEle to preGict´
124 $V an $, macKine encounterV more Gata, it internally aGMuVtV itV own alJoritKm in orGer to
make more accurate cateJori]ationV or preGictionV aEout future Gata See McClellanG, supra note
1
12. See 'aniel R FiVcKel & 'aYiG J RoVV, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in
Financial Markets?, 10 +$RV L REV 0, 12±19 1991 arJuinJ tKat in practice, tKere iV a
low proEaEility tKat Volely traGeEaVeG manipulationV will eYer Ee VucceVVful or profitaEle Fo[ et
al, supra note , at  GiVcuVVinJ VtuGieV VKowinJ tKe e[iVtence of certain typeV of manipulatiYe
EeKaYior Eut commentinJ tKat oYerall tKere iV little Gata VKowinJ Kow often market manipulation
occurV
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nonJoYernmental entitieV are eYen Eetter VuiteG to tKe taVk JiYen tKeir own
e[pertiVe, incentiYeV, anG poVitionV in tKe marketplace
$V VKown Ey tKe impact of *$$3
12
in financial reportinJ, VtanGarGV
eVtaEliVKeG Ey inGepenGent nonJoYernmental orJani]ationV can
VuEVtantially affect tKe way companieV e[erciVe GiliJence
12
$GGitionally,
tKeVe reJulatory EenefitV accrue witKout tKe aGminiVtratiYe EurGen
aVVociateG witK an affirmatiYe reJulatory approYal proceVV
12
$nG wKile
VtanGarGV like *$$3 Go not KaYe tKe force of law, tKey Vtill incentiYi]e
GiliJence, Vince noncompliance can cauVe neJatiYe EuVineVV
repercuVVionV
129
anG can eYen Ee uVeG aV eYiGence in 6ection 10E
actionV
10
7o tKe e[tent tKat an inGuVtry VtanGarG for JeneratinJ $, e[planationV
coulG Ee effectiYe, it coulG reali]e tKeVe Vame EenefitV tKat *$$3 GoeV in
tKe accountinJ conte[t :Kile $, GoeV preVent a cKallenJe in tKat Gifferent
enterpriVeV will uVe Gifferent VyVtemV to meet Gifferent traGinJ oEMectiYeV,
an e[pert EoGy coulG feaViEly Vtay informeG aV to tKe currently aYailaEle
metKoGV for $, e[planationV, like L,ME or ³cloVeVt worlG´
counterfactualV $n 6RO or inGuVtry autKority coulG tKen reTuire
GeYeloperV to GeYiVe tKeir own Vpeciali]eG metKoGV for performinJ tKe
Masri teVt on tKeir macKineV *$$3 VKowV Vimilar fle[iEility can Ee
practicaEle often, tKere are a ranJe of reaVonaEle cKoiceV in financial
reportinJ, anG wKat miJKt Ee improper in one inVtance miJKt Ee acceptaEle
in anotKer
11
MoreoYer, wKile tKiV Note GoeV not Vpecifically aGGreVV otKer
proElemV financial inVtitutionV miJKt encounter wKen uVinJ $,,
12 ³*$$3´ iV an acronym for ³Jenerally accepteG accountinJ principleV´ *$$3 iV iVVueG Ey
tKe Financial $ccountinJ 6tanGarGV BoarG anG referV to tKe Vet of VtanGarGV companieV muVt
comply witK wKen compilinJ financial VtatementV Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), ,NVE67O3E',$, KttpVwwwinYeVtopeGiacomtermVJJaapaVp laVt YiViteG 6ept 21,
2019
12. See 6ean RoVV, Who Enforces GAAP?, ,NVE67O3E',$, KttpVwwwinYeVtopeGiacom
aVkanVwerV02091wKoenforceVJaapaVp laVt upGateG NoY 21, 201 ³>M@oVt companieV
follow *$$3 aV tKouJK tKey were law 7KiV iV one of tKe cKief e[ampleV of priYate EuVineVVeV
reJulatinJ tKemVelYeV to Kelp promote creGiEility witKin an inGuVtry´
12 :Ken corporationV file 6EC manGateG financial GiVcloVureV, tKe 6EC GoeV not JiYe
affirmatiYe approYal to filinJV Division of Corporation Finance: Filing Review Process, U6
6EC & E;C+ COMM¶N Jan 29, 2019, KttpVwwwVecJoYGiYiVionVcorpfincffilinJreYiewKtm
³7Ke 'iYiVion¶V reYiew proceVV iV not a Juarantee tKat tKe GiVcloVure iV complete anG accurate²
reVponViEility for complete anG accurate GiVcloVure lieV witK tKe company anG otKerV inYolYeG in
tKe preparation of a company¶V filinJV´
129. See RoVV, supra note 12 ³Failure to >comply witK *$$3@ coulG Yiolate lenGerV¶
aJreementV, cauVe Vtock priceV to Grop or ruin EuVineVV GealV 7KeVe auGitinJ reTuirementV create
uVeful leYeraJe for tKe F$6B anG *$$3´
10. See In re O[forG +ealtK 3lanV, ,nc 6ec LitiJ, 1 F 6upp 2G 290, 29±9 6'NY
1999
11 7Kor 3ower 7ool Co Y Comm¶r, 49 U6 22, 44 199 ³µ*enerally accepteG
accountinJ principleV¶    tolerate a ranJe of µreaVonaEle¶ treatmentV, leaYinJ tKe cKoice amonJ
alternatiYeV to manaJement´
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inGepenGent orJani]ationV woulG Ee wellVituateG to aGGreVV otKer $,
iVVueV in VecuritieV marketV aV tKey ariVe
12
C W+ATRULE6 6+OUL'RE*ULATOR6 ENACT TO'ETER AN'
'ETECTAI MANIPULATION"
$t a KiJK leYel, inGuVtry VtanGarGV woulG Gefine EotK tKe ³Kow´ anG tKe
³wKen´ for JeneratinJ $, e[planationV 7Ke ³Kow´ referV to GefininJ
parameterV for Kow e[planationV VKoulG Ee JenerateG, Vo tKat tKe reVultV are
accurate 7Ke ³wKen´ referV to GefininJ wKen e[planationV VKoulG Ee
JenerateG, Vo tKat teVtinJ iV efficient anG not oYerly EurGenVome
1
,n
actionV for VeeminJly manipulatiYe conGuct, tKere woulG tKen Ee clearer
eYiGence to JuiGe MuGicial inTuirieV
14
,nVteaG of aVkinJ Kow $, maGe a
GeciVion, tKe inTuiry woulG focuV on wKetKer a GeYeloper reckleVVly
GiVreJarGeG inGuVtry VtanGarGV for Kow anG wKen teVtV VKoulG Ee performeG,
JiYinJ riVe to a manipulation riVk
1
6ucceVVfully GefininJ tKe ³Kow´ anG tKe ³wKen´ for Masri teVtV will
GepenG on reJulatorV¶ aEility to meet two reVpectiYe cKallenJeV FirVt,
reJulatorV will neeG to keep pace witK tKe current Vtate of $, anG
e[planation metKoGV to enVure tKat Masri teVtV accurately preGict market
impact 7KiV iV EecauVe tKere iV no VinJle VtanGarG for ³interpretaEility,´
eVpecially acroVV Gifferent $, moGelV,
1
anG Gifferent interpretaEility
VtanGarGV miJKt Ee warranteG aV $, continueV to GeYelop 6econG, Vo aV
not to EurGen uVeful anG lawful implementationV of $,, reJulatorV will
12 For inVtance, otKerV KaYe KypotKeVi]eG aEout $, tKat can not only traGe Eut can alVo
communicate information on a perVon or entity¶V EeKalf, creatinJ tKe potential for frauGulent
miVVtatementV See BatKaee, supra note 4, at 912 :ere tKiV to Eecome a common $,
implementation, 6ROV or an inGuVtry autKority woulG alreaGy Ee informeG aV to inGuVtry
capaEilitieV for teVtinJ anG monitorinJ $, anG woulG Ee well VituateG to aGGreVV tKeVe typeV of
proElemV
1 7KiV woulG conceiYaEly take into account Vome of tKe factorV tKat woulG Ee uVeG Ey
inYeVtment aGYiVorV in calculatinJ tKe market impact of tKeir traGeV See .ur] Y FiG MJmt &
ReVearcK Co, No 0±CV±09±J3*, 200 :L 292, at 2 6' ,ll June 10, 200
e[plaininJ tKat tKe Guty of EeVt e[ecution inYolYeV analy]inJ Kow a traGe will impact a market
14 For inVtance, wKen a GefenGant failV to follow an accepteG inGuVtry VtanGarG, a court miJKt
aVk wKetKer tKey iJnoreG otKer ³reG flaJV´ See Oxford Health Plans, 1 F 6upp 2G at 29±9
6'NY 1999
1 7KiV aVVumeV tKat manipulation actionV coulG Ee ErouJKt Ey alleJinJ tKat $, GeYeloperV
were reckleVV See GiVcuVVion infra 6ection ,V$ ,n a reckleVVneVV analyViV, tKe inGuVtry VtanGarG
woulG form tKe EaViV for tKe Guty to monitor anG woulG proYiGe a EencKmark for ³orGinary care´
See NoYak Y .aVakV, 21 FG 00, 0 2G Cir 2000 GefininJ reckleVVneVV aV ³conGuct wKicK
iV KiJKly unreaVonaEle anG wKicK repreVentV an e[treme Geparture from tKe VtanGarGV of orGinary
care    to tKe e[tent tKat tKe GanJer waV eitKer known to tKe GefenGant or Vo oEYiouV tKat tKe
GefenGant muVt KaYe Eeen aware of it´ internal Tuotation markV omitteG TuotinJ Rolf Y BlytK,
EaVtman 'illon & Co, ,nc, 0 F2G , 4 2G Cir 19
1. See F,N$LE 'O6+,VELE= & BEEN .,M, 7O:$R'6 $ R,*OROU6 6C,ENCE OF
,N7ER3RE7$BLE M$C+,NE LE$RN,N* 1 Mar 2, 201, KttpVar[iYorJpGf10200pGf
³Unfortunately, tKere iV little conVenVuV on wKat interpretaEility in macKine learninJ is anG Kow
to evaluate it for EencKmarkinJ´
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neeG to Gefine tKe VcenarioV wKen manipulation iV truly a riVk, anG only
inYoke Masri teVtinJ reTuirementV in tKoVe inVtanceV
ReJarGinJ tKe firVt reJulatory cKallenJe, GefininJ parameterV for
accurate Masri teVtV to Gifferentiate Eetween manipulatiYe anG leJitimate
conGuct will reTuire reJulatorV to appriVe tKemVelYeV of tKe limitationV of
interpretaEility metKoGV for $, GeciVionmakinJ 6pecifically, Vince tKere
iV no VinJle inGepenGent YariaEle repreVentinJ tKe impact of a tranVaction on
a Vecurity¶V price, market impact can only Ee rouJKly anticipateG Ey
analy]inJ multiple input YariaEleV
1
But wKen market impact YariaEleV
alVo Eear on leJitimate inYeVtment GeciVionV, tKere iV a riVk tKat Masri teVt
reVultV miJKt Ee oEVcureG
1
7Ke YariaEle control proElem iV effectiYely illuVtrateG in a nonfinancial
e[ample 'eYeloperV createG an $, moGel tKat calculateG riVk of KoVpital
reaGmiVVion for pneumonia patientV EaVeG on YariouV factorV
19
7Ke
GeYeloperV naturally e[pecteG tKat patientV witK aVtKma woulG Ee more
likely to Ee reaGmitteG, Eut GeYeloperV were VurpriVeG to finG tKat tKe moGel
aVVociateG aVtKma witK a lower riVk of reaGmiVVion
140
Upon furtKer
inVpection tKe GeYeloperV reali]eG tKat tKey GiG not account for tKe fact tKat
aVtKma patientV receiYeG Eetter care wKen firVt aGmitteG, anG tKuV aVtKma
Eecame a VtatiVtical pro[y for a factor tKat correlateG witK a lowereG riVk of
reaGmiVVion
141
7KiV proElem GemonVtrateV tKat $, GoeV not neceVVarily map for
Kuman iGeaV of cauVation ratKer, it finGV correlatiYe patternV in Gata
142
:Ken ³aVkinJ´ a macKine wKetKer it woulG KaYe tranVacteG Eut for an
anticipateG cKanJe in price, it will Ee neceVVary to permute YariaEleV
aVVociateG witK market impact
14
But, if tKe macKine KaG a leJitimate
1. See J3 BOUC+$U', 3R,CE ,M3$C7 1 $uJ 24, 201, KttpVar[iYorJpGf090242pGf
³7Ke moVt important TueVtionV are relateG to tKe Yolume GepenGence of impact Go larJer traGeV
impact priceV more", anG tKe temporal EeKaYiour of impact iV tKe impact of a traGe immeGiate
anG permanent, or iV tKere Vome laJ GepenGence of tKe impact"´
1 For e[ample, in tKe conte[t of Kuman traGinJ EeKaYior, courtV KaYe recoJni]eG tKat tKe
timinJ of traGeV cloVer to tKe enG of tKe Gay coulG Ee eYiGence of intent to affect cloVinJ price, or
alternatiYely, coulG Ee relateG to traGerV cloVinJ out tKeir leJitimate poVitionV after a Gay of careful
oEVerYationV See 6EC Y MaVri, 2 F 6upp 2G 1, 9±0 6'NY 200
19 $nGrew 6laYin RoVV, MicKael C +uJKeV & Finale 'oVKiVele], Right for the Right
Reasons: Training Differentiable Models by Constraining Their Explanations, in 3ROCEE',N*6




142. See EGwarGV & Veale, supra note 100, at 9 ³>,@n Vome VyVtemV tKere iV no tKeory
correlatinJ input YariaEleV to tKinJV KumanV unGerVtanG aV cauVal or eYen aV µtKinJV¶´
14 For inVtance, a L,ME e[planation woulG minimi]e YariaEleV relateG to price impact to
Getermine if tKoVe YariaEleV were GeterminatiYe of tKe oriJinal GeciVion in tKe real Gata caVe See
3olicK, supra note 10
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inYeVtment purpoVe, it miJKt KaYe alVo GepenGeG on tKeVe Vame YariaEleV
144
7KuV, eYen if tKe macKine returnV an alternate anVwer after tKe YariaEleV are
cKanJeG in a Masri teVt, it Vtill cannot aEVolutely Ee VaiG tKat tKe price
impact waV tKe Eut for cauVe
7KeVe iVVueV are likely manaJeaEle ,nGeeG, to tKe e[tent tKat a
GeYeloper allowV an $, macKine to traGe autonomouVly, tKe GeYeloper
effectiYely waJerV tKat tKe macKine can make accurate preGictionV aEout
orJanic market actiYity 7KuV, it iV not tKouJKt to Ee unreaVonaEle to reTuire
$, to occaVionally make preGictionV aEout tKe market impact of itV own
traGeV witK a Vimilar GeJree of accuracy For GeYeloperV wKo neYertKeleVV
claim tKat computinJ accurate Masri teVtV iV too Gifficult, tKere miJKt Ee
alternatiYeV For inVtance, Kuman approYal for $, tranVactionV EeyonG a
certain Gollar or VKare tKreVKolG miJKt Ee reTuireG
14
$lternatiYely, otKerV
KaYe VuJJeVteG tKat $, GeYeloperV VKoulG perioGically loJ YerVionV of tKeir
macKine
14
,n tKiV Vcenario, an intereVteG plaintiff miJKt later retrieYe a
prior macKine YerVion GurinJ GiVcoYery anG return a macKine e[planation
tKat a GefenGant refuVeG to proYiGe
EYen if reJulatorV can eVtaEliVK JuiGelineV for accurate Masri teVtV, tKey
will Vtill face tKe VeconG reJulatory cKallenJe GefininJ inVtanceV wKen
Masri teVtV will Ee reTuireG tKat are not oYerly EurGenVome on lawful $,
operation For inVtance, a Elunt reJulation miJKt reTuire $, traGerV to
return an e[planation Eefore eYery tranVaction to minimi]e tKe riVk of
manipulation 7KiV, KoweYer, woulG effectiYely increaVe tKe time reTuireG
to e[ecute a tranVaction ,f tKe $, iV employeG in a capacity wKere tKe
VpeeG of itV computationV iV critical, aV iV alreaGy tKe caVe for many
automateG traGinJ VyVtemV,
14
tKiV Gelay miJKt renGer uVinJ tKe $,
inefficient
ReJulationV miJKt alVo reTuire e[planationV for eacK traininJ
tranVaction to GiVcouraJe manipulatiYe EeKaYior Eefore tKere are any real
time financial VtakeV UVinJ current metKoGV, tKiV miJKt reTuire creatinJ
anG VtorinJ manipulation teVt Gata for eacK real Gata caVe
14
Note, KoweYer,
tKat $, iV normally employeG to make uVe of incompreKenViEly larJe VetV
144 ,n tKe conte[t of Kuman traGinJ EeKaYior, courtV KaYe recoJni]eG tKat tKe timinJ of traGeV
at tKe enG of tKe Gay coulG Ee eYiGence of intent to affect price, or alternatiYely, coulG Ee relateG to
traGerV cloVinJ out tKeir leJitimate poVitionV after a Gay of careful oEVerYationV See 6EC Y MaVri,
2 F 6upp 2G 1, 92 6'NY 200
14. See CKaJalFeferkorn, supra note , at 14 ³UnleVV tKe µperVon in tKe loop¶ neeGV to
autKori]e eacK anG eYery GeciVion Ey tKe alJoritKm, tKe alJoritKm woulG reacK concluVionV EaVeG
on new information tKat tKe Kuman proJrammer woulG not KaYe KaG a cKance to conViGer
*ranteG, tKe proJrammer can certainly Vet EounGarieV tKat tKe alJoritKm may neYer croVV    ´
footnote omitteG
14 :acKtera et al, supra note 10, at 2 n21
14. See 7ara E LeYenV, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securities
Class Actions, 2 U C+, L REV 111, 129 201
14 For inVtance, L,ME reTuireV creatinJ a Gata caVe tKat VliJKtly alterV inputV of a real Gata
caVe to Jenerate e[planationV See 3olicK, supra note 10
12 BROO. J COR3 F,N & COM L >Vol 14
of Gata
149
anG can reTuire larJe VetV of Gata for traininJ
10
ReTuirinJ
GeYeloperV to Jenerate eYen larJer GataVetV for manipulation traininJ coulG
Vimply EurGen tKem witK too mucK information to manaJe 7KiV miJKt Ee
eVpecially EurGenVome conViGerinJ tKat tKere are only limiteG inVtanceV in
wKicK manipulation will Ee YiaEle
11
Ultimately, teVtV woulG likely Ee
reTuireG GurinJ traininJ anG realtime uVe, Eut only upon triJJerinJ of Vome
traGe Yolume tKreVKolG, anG reJulatorV¶ e[pertiVe will Ee critical in GefininJ
tKe VpecificV of tKeVe reTuirementV
7Kere are no perfect VolutionV to tKeVe reJulatory cKallenJeV RatKer,
tKeVe cKallenJeV GemonVtrate tKat reJulation will inYolYe a Ealance Eetween
EotK allowinJ lawful $, uVerV to Eenefit from tKeir innoYation anG
reTuirinJ $, uVerV to Jenerate accurate e[planationV in a limiteG Vet of
VuVpect circumVtanceV 'eYelopinJ reJulationV witK ³moGelaJnoVticiVm´ in
minG can Kelp reJulatorV retain fle[iEility anG allow for VtanGarGV tKat can
Ee applieG to Gifferent typeV of $, macKineV acroVV tKe inGuVtry
12
7Ken
tKe EurGen will riJKtfully reVt on tKe GeYeloperV, wKo know tKeir macKineV
EeVt, to implement VafeJuarGV aJainVt manipulation Like accountantV
followinJ *$$3, GeYeloperV may Velect one of many reaVonaEle metKoGV,
in tKe VKaGow of litiJation tKat loomV oYer tKem if tKey are reckleVV in tKeir
metKoGoloJy
1
,n enactinJ tKeVe reJulationV, reJulatorV may KaYe to Graw EriJKt lineV
Vo tKat Masri teVtV reVult in TuantitatiYely meaninJful reVultV 7KiV iV
YulneraEle to claVVic criticiVmV tKat EriJKt line GefinitionV of manipulation
will eitKer Ee too reVtrictiYe anG Geter leJitimate conGuct, or will fail to
capture all unGeViraEle conGuct Gue to tKe amorpKouV nature of
manipulation
14
7KeVe criticiVmV, KoweYer, Go not conViGer tKe fact tKat
$, capaEilitieV can Ee cKanneleG to meet reJulatory oEliJationV in wayV
tKat woulG not Ee practicaEle for Kuman action
ReJarGinJ tKe firVt criticiVm, GefininJ tranVactionV tKat poVe a
manipulation riVk will not neceVVarily proKiEit tKoVe tranVactionV RatKer, it
will merely reTuire $, GeYeloperV to return an e[planation of tKe Masri
teVt from tKeir macKine 7Kerefore, if tKe macKine waV not in fact
tranVactinJ to manipulate, tKiV will Ee VKown in an accurate teVt
149. See CrawforG, supra note 
10. See +arGeVty, supra note 9
11 FiVcKel & RoVV, supra note 12, at 12±19 GiVcuVVinJ tKat, in practice, tKere iV a low
proEaEility tKat Volely traGeEaVeG manipulationV will eYer Ee VucceVVful or profitaEle
12 +ulVtaert, supra note 101
1 6ee In re O[forG +ealtK 3lanV, ,nc 6ec LitiJ, 1 F 6upp 2G 290, 29±9 6'NY
1999 KolGinJ tKat auGitorV¶ noncompliance witK accepteG accountinJ VtanGarGV anG iJnorance
of otKer ³reG flaJV´ createG a VtronJ inference tKat tKey acteG reckleVVly
14 FiVcKel & RoVV, supra note 12, at 2 ³EYen a VeeminJly narrow leJal rule focuVinJ on
µclear¶ eYiGence of manipulatiYe intent aVVuminJ VucK µclear¶ eYiGence e[iVtV iV unlikely to
proYiGe net Vocial EenefitV´
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$GGitionally, GeYeloperV will Ee alloweG to cuVtomi]e Masri teVtV for tKeir
own macKineV, forecloVinJ arJumentV tKat reJulationV are unworkaEle
7KiV leaGV to tKe VeconG criticiVm tKat allowinJ GeYeloperV to Vet tKeir
own teVt parameterV EaVeG on arEitrary limitV will allow Vome manipulatiYe
conGuct to Jo unGetecteG ,nGeeG, arEitrary limitV miJKt not capture ³tKe
full ranJe of inJeniouV GeYiceV tKat miJKt Ee uVeG to manipulate VecuritieV
priceV´
1
But reJulationV will Vtill Geter manipulation for two reaVonV
FirVt, if eYiGence can Ee put fortK tKat certain conGuct waV in fact
manipulatiYe, merely tecKnical or formaliVtic compliance witK an inGuVtry
VtanGarG will not e[cuVe a GeYeloper from liaEility
1
6econG, any
manipulatiYe conGuct tKat fallV EeyonG tKe proKiEitionV of EriJKtline ruleV
will Ee riVkier for potential manipulatorV CriticV of market manipulation
reJulation alreaGy acknowleGJe tKat manipulatiYe conGuct iV ³Velf
GeterrinJ´ JiYen tKe rarity of inVtanceV wKere it iV profitaEle anG tKe riVk of
loVt inYeVtment if otKer market forceV foil tKe manipulation
1
Naturally,
pourinJ more capital into tKe manipulation can leVVen tKe impact of any
GiVruptionV, anG tKerefore increaVe tKe likeliKooG of VucceVV for tKe
manipulation, Yia a ³price preVVure´ effect
1
6o wKile reTuirinJ
e[planationV for certain tranVactionV miJKt not Getect all potentially
manipulatiYe EeKaYior, it can proYiGe a Geterrent in tKe ranJe of
manipulationV tKat are tKe VafeVt EetV $nG wKile $, traGerV miJKt Vtill Ee
capable of Vome riVkier manipulationV, tKey will neceVVarily KaYe Vome pre
proJrammeG riVk appetite,
19
anG tKey may Ee preYenteG from GoinJ Vo
OtKer proYiVionV in tKe $ct like 6ection 1E operate Vimilarly conGuct
tKat on itV face may eitKer Ee nefariouV or innocent cannot Ee proKiEiteG
1 6anta Fe ,nGuV, ,nc Y *reen, 40 U6 42, 4± 19
1 7o continue tKe analoJy to *$$3, courtV KaYe recoJni]eG compliance witK *$$3 in
financial reportinJ GoeV not e[cuVe companieV tKat neYertKeleVV prepare miVleaGinJ financial
VtatementV See U6 Y EEEerV, 4 FG 110, 12 2G Cir 200
1 FiVcKel & RoVV, supra note 12, at 12±19 GiVcuVVinJ tKat in practice, tKere iV a low
proEaEility tKat traGeEaVeG manipulationV will eYer Ee VucceVVful or profitaEle
1 :Kile tKe e[iVtence of tKe effect iV GeEateG, eYen tKoVe Vkeptical of tKe effect recoJni]e
tKat to tKe e[tent it e[iVtV, ³VecuritieV KaYe Vupply anG GemanG elaVticitieV no Vmaller in maJnituGe
tKan 1 7KiV meanV tKat a proVpectiYe manipulator muVt purcKaVe at leaVt one percent of tKe firm¶V
outVtanGinJ VKareV to cauVe a one percent cKanJe in price 6ucK a larJe capital outlay e[poVeV tKe
woulGEe manipulator to tremenGouV riVk    ´ FiVcKel & RoVV, supra note 12, at 1±19
footnote omitteG 6ucK riVkV Vupport tKe point tKat Masri teVtinJ for tKeVe typeV of tranVactionV
woulG proYiGe an aGGitional Geterrent effect, aV it woulG force woulGEe manipulatorV into eYen
riVkier tranVactionV to aYoiG Getection
19 EYen tKouJK an $, traGer will conVtantly make preGictionV, GeYeloperV are likely to only
allow tKe macKine to traGe on preGictionV tKat are VupporteG Ey Vome leYel of confiGence See
.uttruf, supra note 24 GiVcuVVinJ tKat GeYeloperV will KaYe to manually input parameterV like ³a
tKreVKolG for tKe moGel confiGence of a JiYen preGiction´ in orGer to JuiGe Kow a macKine actV on
itV market preGictionV
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outriJKt, Vo a EriJKtline rule iV Grawn to proKiEit tKe conGuct in inVtanceV
wKere it iV more likely to Ee nefariouV
10
I9 JU'ICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF RE*ULATION6
$V GiVcuVVeG, tKiV Note only conViGerV Kow an inGuVtry VtanGarG woulG
reJulate conGuct aJainVt tKe EackGrop of tKe current 6ection 10E Goctrine
7KiV iV not neceVVarily a neJatiYe limitation JuGJeV KaYe traGitionally
retaineG fle[iEility in meetinJ tKe leJiVlatiYe purpoVeV of tKe $ct aV tKe
nature of frauGulent actiYity KaV eYolYeG in tKe paVt eiJKty yearV
11
,n tKiV
traGition of fle[iEility, moGern realitieV will reTuire courtV to make two
leJal reali]ationV to account for tKe fact tKat tKe 6ection 10E Goctrine KaV
yet to encounter $,
12
 1 reckleVV conGuct can VatiVfy Vcienter in
appropriate $, manipulation caVeV anG 2 GeYiationV from inGuVtry
VtanGarGV for $, GeYelopment can proYiGe circumVtantial eYiGence of
reckleVVneVV
1
A RECKLE66NE66MAY BEA 6UFFICIENT 6CIENTER INMARKET
MANIPULATIONCA6E6
$V GiVcuVVeG, tKe importance of Vcienter in market manipulation actionV
KaV leG Vome to concluGe tKat reckleVV, aV oppoVeG to intentional conGuct,
cannot create liaEility
14
+oweYer, it iV wortKwKile to conViGer wKetKer
courtV KaYe reMecteG reckleVVneVV in manipulation caVeV, or wKetKer it iV MuVt
an unlikely alleJation JiYen tKe typical manipulation fact patternV
1
10 6ection 1E of tKe $ct permitV recoYery of any comEination of purcKaVeV anG ValeV of
eTuity VecuritieV witKin any Vi[montK perioG Ey any officer, Girector, or 10 VKareKolGer of a
company witK VecuritieV reJiVtereG unGer tKe $ct See CreGit 6uiVVe 6ec U6$ LLC Y
6immonGV,  U6 221, 22 2012 7KuV, a temporally e[tenGeG form of inViGer traGinJ iV not
e[preVVly proKiEiteG, Eut inViGerV will incur tKe riVk of forfeitinJ JainV witKin tKe Vi[montK perioG
if tKey cKooVe to act on inViGe information
11 :Kile not Girectly aGGreVVinJ market manipulation, tKe 6upreme Court KaV acknowleGJeG
tKat ³>w@Ken we Geal witK priYate actionV unGer Rule 10E, we Geal witK a MuGicial oak wKicK KaV
Jrown from little more tKan a leJiVlatiYe acorn´ anG tKat witK reVpect to Rule 10E, tKe court will
take into account policy conViGerationV wKen ³neitKer tKe conJreVVional enactment nor tKe
aGminiVtratiYe reJulationV offer concluViYe JuiGance´ Blue CKip 6tampV Y Manor 'ruJ 6toreV,
421 U6 2,  19
12. See JoKn C Coffee, Jr, Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of
Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 201 COLUM BU6 L REV 21, 1 ³Rule 10E waV
intenGeG to eYolYe to keep pace witK tKe inJenuity of frauGVterV´
1 'eVpite tKe opacity anG autonomy of any JiYen $, macKine, courtV VKoulG feel
comfortaEle MuGJinJ tKe conGuct of tKe GeYeloperV wKen tKey are in control of tKe Gata EeinJ feG
into a macKine anG monitorinJ itV operation See CrawforG, supra note  ³7Ke Jreat reYeal aEout
>macKine learninJ alJoritKmV@ iV tKat tKey aren¶t all tKat Vmart²tKey¶re EaVically MuVt feelinJ
arounG, tKrouJK trial anG error, to try anG finG tKe relationVKipV in your Gata´
14. See YereV et al, supra note 9
1. See, e.g., 6EC Y Lek 6ec Corp, 2 F 6upp G 49, 0 6'NY 201 GiVcuVVinJ tKe
Vufficiency of reckleVVneVV to eVtaEliVK Vcienter in 6ection 10E actionV, in an action ErouJKt
Vpecifically for market manipulation
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For inVtance, ATSI KaV Eeen citeG for tKe propoVition tKat reckleVVneVV
cannot VatiVfy market manipulation Vcienter
1
EecauVe of tKe critical nature
of intent
1
7Kere are tKree proElemV witK tKiV contention FirVt,
reckleVVneVV waV not alleJeG in ATSI²intent waV anG tKe court Vimply
founG tKat tKe eYiGence GiG not Vupport tKe alleJation 6econG, Eefore
GiVcuVVinJ tKe importance of Vcienter, tKe court noteG at tKe outVet of itV
analyViV tKat plaintiffV can alleJe Vcienter witK ³VtronJ circumVtantial
eYiGence of conVciouV miVEeKaYior or reckleVVneVV,´
1
for all 6ection 10E
actionV 7KirG, tKe 6econG Circuit KaV elVewKere VtateG tKat ³reckleVVneVV iV
a Vufficiently culpaEle mental Vtate in tKe VecuritieV frauG conte[t,´
19
anG
KaV founG tKat plaintiffV not alleJinJ Vpecific intent may Vtill proYe
³conVciouV reckleVVneVV²ie, a Vtate of minG approximating actual intent 
  ´
10
7Kerefore, wKile reckleVVneVV miJKt reTuire a VtronJer eYiGentiary
VKowinJ,
11
courtV KaYe recoJni]eG tKat it iV merely an alternatiYe meanV to
VatiVfyinJ 6ection 10E Vcienter anG not an inVufficient form of culpaEility
For tKe Vame reaVon tKat tKe current manipulation Goctrine proYiGeV no
Kome for $,, it iV alVo KiVtorically unlikely tKat plaintiffV woulG neeG to
alleJe reckleVVneVV in manipulation caVeV ,n inVtanceV wKere manipulation
occurV EecauVe of a GefenGant¶V failure to monitor anotKer, controlperVon
liaEility, wKicK reTuireV no proof of Vcienter,
12
iV a more faYoraEle option
$GGitionally, wKile miVVtatementV anG omiVVionV often inYolYe aYoiGance
or iJnorance of information, for wKicK reckleVVneVV proYiGeV a Eetter
analytical framework, manipulation KaV up until now alwayV reTuireG
affirmatiYe actV
1
For tKeVe reaVonV, any e[iVtinJ GiVparity Eetween tKe
freTuency of VucceVVful reckleVVneVV alleJationV in miVVtatement anG
omiVVionV caVeV compareG to manipulation caVeV iV likely a proGuct of tKiV
practical Gynamic LookinJ to tKe Vtatute itVelf, 6ection 10E GiVcuVVeV
1. See YereV et al, supra note 9, at 
1. See $76, Commc¶nV, ,nc Y 6Kaar FunG, LtG., 49 FG , 102 2G Cir 200
1. See id. at 99
19 7eamVterV Local 44 FreiJKt 'iY 3enVion FunG Y 'yne[ Capital ,nc, 1 FG 190, 194
2G Cir 200
10 6 CKerry 6t, LLC Y +enneVVee *rp LLC,  FG 9, 109 2G Cir 2009
11. See EC$ Y J3 MorJan CKaVe Co,  FG 1, 199 2G Cir 2009 recoJni]inJ tKat
Vince reckleVVneVV GoeV not inYolYe a Vpecific motiYe Ey tKe GefenGant, tKe ³VtrenJtK of tKe
circumVtantial alleJationV muVt Ee correVponGinJly Jreater´ to proYe Vcienter
12. See 3aracor Fin, ,nc Y *en Elec Capital Corp., 9 FG 111, 111 9tK Cir 199
³7Ke plaintiff neeG not VKow tKe controllinJ perVon¶V Vcienter or tKat tKey µculpaEly participateG¶
in tKe alleJeG wronJGoinJ´
1. See Fo[ et al, supra note , at 124 ³>$@ manipulation claim unGer Rule 10E, eYen
wKen it inYolYeV miVrepreVentationV, alVo reTuireV µmanipulatiYe actV¶´ citinJ ATSI Commc’ns,
49 FG  FiVcKel & RoVV, supra note 12, at 12 ³>7@Ke analoJy >Eetween manipulation anG
frauGulent nonGiVcloVure@ EreakV Gown upon cloVer analyViV NonGiVcloVure in law iV actionaEle
only wKen tKere iV a Guty to Vpeak ariVinJ from oEMectiYely oEVerYaEle criteria, VucK aV tKe
relationVKip Eetween tKe partieV´
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Geceit anG manipulation toJetKer, anG tKey are Vimilarly proKiEiteG
14
7Kere
iV no inGication tKat ConJreVV intenGeG to impoVe Gifferent culpaEility
reTuirementV for a miVVtatement aV oppoVeG to a manipulatiYe act
EYen if reckleVVneVV KaV KiVtorically Eeen an unlikely canGiGate for
market manipulation, tKe e[iVtinJ reckleVVneVV Goctrine for
miVrepreVentationV will apply MuVt aV well to reckleVV GeYeloperV of $, 7KiV
iV EecauVe reckleVVneVV can Ee proYen Ey VKowinJ tKat GefenGantV ³faileG to
reYiew or cKeck information tKat tKey KaG Guty to monitor or iJnoreG
oEYiouV ViJnV of frauG,´
1
anG inGuVtry VtanGarGV coulG conceiYaEly outline
tKiV Guty for manipulation
7wo e[ampleV GiVcuVVeG Eelow inYolYe inVtanceV wKere courtV KaYe
founG liaEility unGer 6ection 10E for Geceit in inVtanceV wKere GefenGantV
faileG to monitor certain actiYity LiaEility in tKe firVt caVe inYolYeG a failure
of moGern tecKnoloJy, anG liaEility in tKe VeconG turneG only on tKe actionV
anG inaction of Kuman actorV 7oJetKer, tKeVe caVeV GemonVtrate tKe
fle[iEility of tKe reckleVVneVV Goctrine anG wKy it will proYiGe a JooG fit for
reckleVV uVe of manipulatiYe $,
FirVt, in Facebook, a Vtock e[cKanJe¶V failure to properly teVt an
automateG Vtock traGinJ platform conVtituteG reckleVVneVV wKen tKe
e[cKanJe anticipateG a KiJK traGe Yolume anG touteG tKe platform¶V
potential, Eut tKe VyVtem ultimately faileG to e[ecute traGeV in a timely
manner
1
:Kile notKinJ in tKe Facebook recorG VuJJeVtV tKat tKe VyVtem
waV autonomouV or a Elack Eo[, GetailV pertaininJ to how tKe VyVtem faileG
were not releYant to tKe leJal Getermination 6imply VtateG, tKe e[cKanJe
GeYelopeG an automateG VyVtem for itV own Eenefit anG unGerVtooG tKat itV
failure coulG aGYerVely affect traGerV on tKe e[cKanJe yet GiVreJarGeG tKat
riVk to Geploy an inaGeTuate VyVtem anywayV :Kile tKe reckleVVly
GiVreJarGeG riVk in Facebook waV of miVrepreVentation to traGerV, tKiV Note
poVitV tKat an analoJouV factpattern will eYentually emerJe wKere tKe riVk
iV of $, manipulation inVteaG $t tKat point, it will aJain Ee important to
aVk wKetKer tKere iV a principleG reaVon for finGinJ tKat tKe former caVe can
create liaEility, wKile tKe latter cannot BecauVe once tKiV artificial
GiVtinction iV caVt aViGe, tKe Facebook Yariety of reckleVVneVV will proYiGe a
uVeful framework for KolGinJ $, GeYeloperV accountaEle
,t iV fair to oEVerYe tKat Facebook inYolYeG a caVe wKere tKere waV
eYiGence of tKe GefenGantV¶ knowleGJe of tKe VyVtem¶V potential
14 6ection 10E of tKe $ct makeV it illeJal ³>t@o uVe or employ, in connection witK tKe
purcKaVe or Vale of any Vecurity    any manipulatiYe or GeceptiYe GeYice´ 1 U6C  ME
2012
1 Cornwell Y CreGit 6uiVVe *rp., 9 F 6upp 2G 29,  6'NY 2010 citinJ NoYak
Y .aVakV, 21 FG 00, 0 2G Cir 2000
1. See In re FaceEook, ,nc, ,3O 6ec & 'eriYatiYe LitiJ, 9 F 6upp 2G 42 6'NY
201
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inaGeTuacieV
1
Future GefenGantV in $, manipulation caVeV miJKt arJue
tKat Vince $, actionV cannot Ee anticipateG, tKen KolGinJ GeYeloperV liaEle
for any VuVpiciouV, une[plainaEle tranVaction will effectiYely impoVe Vtrict
liaEility But tKiV arJument finGV no VympatKy unGer tKe e[iVtinJ 6ection
10E reckleVVneVV Goctrine $ VeconG e[ample GemonVtrateV tKat
³knowleGJe´ GoeV not neceVVarily reTuire a GefenGant to know or Ee aEle to
e[plain e[actly Kow frauGulent eYentV tranVpireG to Eecome liaEle, if tKey
iJnoreG a Guty to monitor tKe Vource of tKe frauG
,n Rolf, a plaintiff wKoVe inYeVtmentV were VTuanGereG Ey a tKirGparty
aGYiVor ErouJKt a 6ection 10E claim aJainVt tKeir intermeGiary Eroker
EecauVe tKe Eroker inVtilleG confiGence in tKe plaintiff aEout tKeir
inYeVtmentV witK tKe aGYiVor
1
7Ke court founG tKat tKe GefenGant KaG
acteG reckleVVly in Yiolation of 6ection 10E EecauVe Ke knew tKat tKe
aGYiVor KaG maGe unVucceVVful inYeVtmentV in tKe paVt anG faileG to
aGeTuately VuperYiVe tKe aGYiVor
19
7Ke court maGe no finGinJ tKat tKe
GefenGant intentionally encouraJeG tKe tKirGparty aGYiVor to frauGulently
miVmanaJe KiV client¶V money
10
,nGeeG, tKe GefenGant GiG not neeG to
inVtruct, participate in, or Vpecifically unGerVtanG Kow tKe aGYiVor
miVmanaJeG tKe money to Ee KelG liaEle 7Ke aGYiVor¶V tKouJKtV anG
intentionV miJKt aV well KaYe Eeen a ³Elack Eo[´ EeyonG tKe GefenGant¶V
compreKenVion, Eut tKe GefenGant¶V failure to monitor anG reVtrict tKe
aGYiVor¶V frauGulent actionV neYertKeleVV conVtituteG reckleVVneVV
11
7KiV analoJy of tKe Kuman minG to an $, traGer GoeV not VuJJeVt tKat
$, will Ee Vo Kumanlike in itV autonomy tKat VtraiJKtforwarG applicationV
of aJency or YicariouV liaEility are appropriate ,t iV Vimply a compariVon to
VKow tKat KumanV can Ee aV opaTue anG comple[ aV any $, macKine, anG
tKiV KaV not preYenteG courtV from followinJ circumVtantial eYiGence of
Kuman reckleVVneVV 7Kerefore, if inGuVtry VtanGarGV can proYiGe a
EencKmark for $, oYerViJKt, courtV will Ee eTuippeG to Vimilarly analy]e
eYiGence of Kuman reckleVVneVV, wKere it e[iVtV
1. See id. at 4
1 Rolf Y BlytK, EaVtman 'illon & Co, ,nc., 0 F2G , 4 2G Cir 19
19. Id. at 4
10 7KiV iV not VurpriVinJ tKe liaEility of tKe GefenGant waV preGicateG on tKe inYeVtment
aGYiVor¶V frauGulent actV, anG KaG tKe inYeVtment aGYiVor not acteG frauGulently, tKe GefenGant
coulG KaYe aYoiGeG Vuit See id.
11 7Ke liaEility in Rolf waV EaVeG on an aiGinJanGaEettinJ tKeory, Eefore it waV eliminateG
aV a EaViV for liaEility Ey tKe 6upreme Court in Central Bank of Denver One court, KoweYer, KaV
recoJni]eG tKat at tKe time, tKere were no JrounGV for GiVtinction Eetween primary YiolatorV witK
VeconGary roleV anG aiGerV anG aEettorV 7Kat Vame court concluGeG tKat if tKe Vame action were
ErouJKt toGay, it alVo woulG moVt likely conVtitute a primary Yiolation aV well See In re 3armalat
6ec LitiJ.,  F 6upp 2G 42, 49 6'NY 200
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B NONCOMPLIANCE WIT+AI IN'U6TRY 6TAN'AR'6 I6
E9I'ENCE OFRECKLE66NE66
ReckleVVneVV inYolYeV conGuct tKat iV ³KiJKly unreaVonaEle anG wKicK
repreVentV an e[treme Geparture from tKe VtanGarGV of orGinary care to tKe
e[tent tKat tKe GanJer waV eitKer known to tKe GefenGant or Vo oEYiouV tKat
tKe GefenGant muVt KaYe Eeen aware of it´
12
$n inGuVtry VtanGarG for $,
GeYelopment will Ee uVeful in GefininJ VtanGarGV of orGinary care
+oweYer, courtV will KaYe tKe Gifficult taVk of GetermininJ wKen GefenGant
GeYeloperV muVt KaYe Eeen aware of riVkV anG maGe an e[treme Geparture
from tKoVe orGinary VtanGarGV
7KiV Gifficulty in VKowinJ Vcienter KaV e[iVteG in tKe 6ection 10E
Goctrine lonJ Eefore tKe uVe of computerV
1
'irect eYiGence of intent iV
rare, anG correVponGinJly, 6ection 10E actionV are commonly ErouJKt on
tKe EaViV of circumVtantial eYiGence
14
7o EeJin at tKe pleaGinJ VtaJe, tKe
6upreme Court KaV KelG tKat 6ection 10E complaintV will only VucceeG ³if
a reaVonaEle perVon woulG Geem tKe inference of Vcienter coJent anG at
leaVt aV compellinJ aV any oppoVinJ inference one coulG Graw from tKe factV
alleJeG´
1
7Ke Court noteG tKat inferenceV neeG not Ee of tKe ³µVmokinJ
Jun¶ Jenre, or eYen tKe µmoVt plauViEle of competinJ inferenceV¶´
1
NeYertKeleVV, tKiV Vtill preVentV a VuEVtantial EurGen to plaintiffV For
e[ample, courtV KaYe GiVmiVVeG claimV wKen oppoVinJ inferenceV of mere
³miVmanaJement´ GiG not riVe to tKe leYel of reckleVVneVV
1
,nGeeG, in
caVeV wKere claimV ultimately alleJe tKat inaction reVulteG in a 6ection
10E Yiolation, it iV Gifficult for plaintiffV to pleaG factV GiVtinJuiVKinJ
reckleVVneVV from oppoVinJ inferenceV of mere neJliJence
1
$t tKe pleaGinJ VtaJe, KoweYer, courtV VKoulG recoJni]e tKat tKe Elack
Eo[ proElem coulG actually tip in faYor of plaintiffV ErinJinJ $,
manipulation claimV BecauVe wKile tKe Elack Eo[ proElem miJKt
complicate plaintiff¶V VucceVV on tKe meritV, all tKat iV neceVVary at tKe
pleaGinJ VtaJe iV an inference tKat iV at leaVt aV VtronJ aV a nonculpaEle
12 .alnit Y EicKler, 24 FG 11, 142 2G Cir 2001
1. See 7Ke FeGeral Corp, E[cKanJe $ct ReleaVe No 4909, 2 6EC 22, 194 :L
2449, at  Jan 29, 194 ³6ince it iV impoVViEle to proEe into tKe GeptKV of a man¶V minG, it iV
neceVVary in tKe uVual caVe    tKat tKe finGinJ of manipulatiYe purpoVe Ee EaVeG on inferenceV
Grawn from circumVtantial eYiGence´
14 7KiV iV eYiGenceG Ey tKe fact tKat pleaGinJ VtanGarGV for alleJinJ 6ection 10E Vcienter are
frameG arounG circumVtantial eYiGence, preVumaEly EecauVe tKat iV all plaintiffV KaYe acceVV to in
moVt caVeV See $76, Commc¶nV, ,nc Y 6Kaar FunG, LtG., 49 FG , 99 2G Cir 200
KolGinJ tKat a plaintiff may VatiVfy pleaGinJ reTuirementV Ey alleJinJ factV ³conVtitutinJ VtronJ
circumVtantial eYiGence of conVciouV miVEeKaYior or reckleVVneVV´
1 7ellaEV, ,nc Y Makor ,VVueV & RiJKtV, LtG, 1 U6 0, 24 200
1. Id.
1. See:eVtcKeVter 7eamVterV 3enVion FunG Y UB6 $*, 04 F $pp¶[ ,  2G Cir 201
1. See, e.g., 6 CKerry 6t, LLC Y +enneVVee *roup LLC,  FG 9 2G Cir 2009
finGinJ it more likely tKat tKe GefenGant financial firm waV merely neJliJent, anG not
intentionally frauGulent, in failinJ to perform Gue GiliJence
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competinJ inference
19
CourtV KaYe founG tKat certain conGuct on itV face
can JiYe riVe to an inference of manipulation
190
7Kerefore, plaintiffV wKo
Vpecifically pleaG tKat a profitmotiYateG macKine maGe a facially
manipulatiYe tranVaction miJKt raiVe a plauViEle inference, forcinJ
GefenGantV to raiVe a competinJ one tKat iV more compellinJ
Note, it iV not e[plicitly tKe GefenGant¶V EurGen to raiVe oppoVinJ
inferenceV anG pKraVinJ it aV VucK coulG Ee conViGereG a
miVcKaracteri]ation
191
,t iV correct tKat at tKe pleaGinJ VtaJe a GefenGant
often GoeV not eYen KaYe an opportunity,
192
let alone a EurGen, to put fortK
eYiGence refutinJ a claim $ccorGinJly, Tellabs KelG tKat trial courtV VKoulG
Getermine wKat competinJ inferenceV are raiVeG in tKe complaint
19
,n Vome
caVeV, KoweYer, courtV GiVcuVV competinJ inferenceV JleaneG from tKe
complaint aV arJumentV raiVeG Ey GefenGantV
194
OYerall, it coulG Ee VaiG
tKat GefenGantV KaYe an informal EurGen to raiVe a competinJ inference
from tKe complaint if tKe court cannot locate one on itV own initiatiYe ,n
practice, e[tractinJ competinJ inferenceV iV not really mucK of a EurGen to
anyone, Vince it Vimply reTuireV courtV to Graw on tKeir own Kuman
e[perienceV wKen conViGerinJ alternate reaVonV for tKe alleJeG conGuct
19
:Ken complaintV alleJe manipulation Ey an $, Elack Eo[, KoweYer,
courtV muVt reali]e tKat tKey cannot Graw from tKiV Vame well of Kuman
e[perience anG common VenVe, anG a de facto EurGen will fall on tKe
GefenGant to raiVe a competinJ inference 6uEVeTuently, wKen GefenGantV
cannot e[plain tKeir $,¶V intent EeyonG Jeneral profitaEility, courtV VKoulG
reMect competinJ inferenceV of mere neJliJence aV leVV compellinJ EYen
wKen GefenGantV actually KaYe Vome e[planation metKoGV in place for
monitorinJ, tKey Vtill miJKt only raiVe a factual GiVpute inappropriate for a
motion to GiVmiVV tKe complaint
19
,n EotK VcenarioV, plaintiffV woulG Ee
aEle to puVK forwarG into GiVcoYery :Kile GefenGantV miJKt reVent tKe
19 7ellaEV, ,nc Y Makor ,VVueV & RiJKtV, LtG., 1 U6 0, 24 200
190 6EC Y MaVri, 2 F 6upp 2G 1,  200 acknowleGJinJ tKat in Vome caVeV ³>t@Ke
GefenGant¶V manipulatiYe intent can Ee inferreG from tKe conGuct itVelf´
191 6ince Tellabs GeVcriEeV a pleaGinJ VtanGarG, unVurpriVinJly, it iV only focuVeG on tKe
plaintiff¶V alleJationV in tKe complaint See Tellabs, 1 U6 at 24, 2 KolGinJ tKat tKe
inference of Vcienter VKoulG Ee at leaVt aV compellinJ aV ³any oppoVinJ inference one coulG Graw
from tKe factV alleJeG´ anG tKat courtV muVt reYiew ³all tKe alleJationV KoliVtically´
192. See id. at 22 ³>F@aceG witK a Rule 12E motion to GiVmiVV a  10E action, courtV
muVt, aV witK any motion to GiVmiVV for failure to pleaG a claim on wKicK relief can Ee JranteG,
accept all factual alleJationV in tKe complaint aV true´
19. See id. at 24, 2 KolGinJ tKat tKe inference of Vcienter VKoulG Ee at leaVt aV compellinJ
aV ³any oppoVinJ inference one coulG Graw from tKe factV alleJeG´ anG tKat courtV muVt reYiew
³all tKe alleJationV KoliVtically´
194. SeeMatri[[ ,nitiatiYeV, ,nc Y 6iracuVano,  U6 2, 4±49 2011
19 7Ke VtanGarG for aVVeVVinJ inferenceV Grawn from tKe complaint iV from tKe point of Yiew
of a ³reaVonaEle perVon´ Tellabs, 1 U6 at 24, 2
19. See id. at 22 ³>F@aceG witK a Rule 12E motion to GiVmiVV a  10E action, courtV
muVt, aV witK any motion to GiVmiVV for failure to pleaG a claim on wKicK relief can Ee JranteG,
accept all factual alleJationV in tKe complaint aV true´
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proJreVVion of litiJation, JiYen tKe current aEVence of reJulationV, tKey
woulG proEaEly Vtill feel confiGent aEout VucceeGinJ on tKe meritV BecauVe
witK no oEliJation on tKe GefenGant to Gocument macKine EeKaYior, tKe
plaintiff woulG likely Ee unaEle to JatKer factV to proYe tKe macKine¶V
manipulatiYe intent EeyonG a preponGerance of tKe eYiGence
19
$V GiVcuVVeG earlier, tKiV will Ee tKe point at wKicK inGuVtry VtanGarGV
will proYiGe Yalue 'efenGantV tKat are GiliJent in tKeir aGKerence to $,
GeYelopment VtanGarGV will Ee aEle to proGuce recorGV anG Vwiftly force
Vummary MuGJment
19
+oweYer, wKen GefenGantV Go not comply witK all
inGuVtry VtanGarGV, a plaintiff witK a meritoriouV claim can uVe tKe
GiVcoYery proceVV to VKow tKat GeYiation from $, inGuVtry VtanGarGV waV
not MuVt neJliJent, Eut reckleVV 7KiV iV wKere reJulatory creation of paper
trailV will aiG tKe plaintiff²not Ey carryinJ tKe weiJKt of a Vtatute, Eut Ey
proYiGinJ eYiGence of tKe conGuct itVelf OEYiouVly, a GefenGant wKo GoeV
not aGKere to VtanGarGV anG failV to keep recorGV will weiJK unGer KeaYier
eYiGence of reckleVVneVV ConYerVely, a GefenGant wKo cannot e[plain tKeir
macKine in complete compliance witK inGuVtryEeVt practice Eut putV otKer
limitationV in place to preYent aJainVt manipulation miJKt fare Eetter in
proYinJ away liaEility, GeVpite tKeir lack of compliance ,n any eYent,
inGuVtry VtanGarGV will Jenerate more eYiGence reflectiYe of Kuman Vcienter
$t tKiV point, courtV can uVe tKe EoGy of 6ection 10E Goctrine to make
aGMuGicationV aV tKey KaYe for tKe Eetter part of a century
CONCLU6ION
,n concluVion, tKere iV a potent riVk tKat $, will eYentually participate
in VecuritieV marketV anG will complicate enforcement of market
manipulation reJulationV tKat only contemplate Kuman actorV 7Kerefore,
carefully GefininJ market manipulation anG eVtaEliVKinJ effectiYe inGuVtry
VtanGarGV will EotK Geter $, manipulation anG allow for enforcement of
actionV unGer tKe traGitional 6ection 10E framework
Daniel W. Slemmer
*
19. See id. at 2±29 ³$ plaintiff alleJinJ frauG in a  10E action, we KolG toGay, muVt pleaG
factV renGerinJ an inference of Vcienter at least as likely as any plauViEle oppoVinJ inference $t
trial, VKe muVt tKen proYe Ker caVe Ey a µpreponGerance of tKe eYiGence¶ 6tateG otKerwiVe, VKe
muVt GemonVtrate tKat it iV more likely tKan not tKat tKe GefenGant acteG witK Vcienter´
19. See Celote[ Corp Y Catrett, 4 U6 1, 22 19 ³>E@ntry of Vummary MuGJment iV
manGateG, after aGeTuate time for GiVcoYery anG upon motion, aJainVt a party wKo failV to make a
VKowinJ Vufficient to eVtaEliVK tKat e[iVtence of an element eVVential to tKat party¶V caVe anG on
wKicK tKat party will Eear tKe EurGen of proof at trial´
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